University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
Economics
2011

Delegation in Immigration Law
Eric A. Posner
dangelolawlib+ericposner1@gmail.com

Adam B. Cox
Adam.Cox@chicagounbound.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Eric Posner & Adam B. Cox, "Delegation in Immigration Law" (John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics Working Paper No. 572, 2011).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and
Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law
and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CHICAGO
JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 572
(2D SERIES)
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 360

DELEGATION IN IMMIGRATION LAW
Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner

THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
September 2011
This paper can be downloaded without charge at the John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics Working Paper Series: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html
and at the Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series:
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/index.html
and The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection.

DELEGATION IN IMMIGRATION LAW
Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner†
September 1, 2011
Immigration law both screens migrants and regulates the behavior of migrants after they have arrived.
Both activities are information-intensive because the migrant’s “type” and the migrant’s post-arrival
activity are often forms of private information that are not immediately accessible to government
agents. To overcome this information problem, the national government can delegate the screening
and regulation functions. American immigration law, for example, delegates extensive authority to
both private entities—paradigmatically, employers and families—and to the fifty states. From the
government’s perspective, delegation carries with it benefits and costs. On the benefit side, agents
frequently have easy access to information about the types and activities of migrants, and can cheaply
monitor and control them. On the cost side, agents’ preferences are not always aligned with those of
the national government. The national government can ameliorate these costs by giving agents
incentives to act consistently with the government’s interests. Understanding these virtues and vices
of delegation sheds light on longstanding debates about the roles that employers, families, and states
play in American immigration law.
I. Principals, Agents, and Delegation ............................................................................................................... 4
II. Employers....................................................................................................................................................... 9
A. Labor Immigration Rules ................................................................................................................... 9
B. The First-Order Goal of Employment Migration Policy ............................................................ 12
C. The Advantages from Delegation to Employers .......................................................................... 14
D. Disadvantages of Delegation: Misalignment of Preferences ...................................................... 14
E. The Structure of Employment Delegation .................................................................................... 16
F. Choosing and Coordinating Multiple Agents ................................................................................ 25
III. Families........................................................................................................................................................ 26
A. Family Reunification Rules .............................................................................................................. 26
B. Possible Justifications for Delegating Admissions Authority to Family Members .................. 28
C. Multiple Agents, Collective Action, and Path Dependency ........................................................ 35
IV. States ............................................................................................................................................................ 37
A. The Role of States in Federal Immigration Law ........................................................................... 38
B. Identifying Removable Noncitizens ............................................................................................... 42
C. Tailoring Immigration Policy to Local Conditions....................................................................... 47
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................... 52

Professor of Law, NYU School of Law, and Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law, University of
Chicago Law School. Thanks to workshop participants at the University of Chicago Law School, and
to David Woolston for research assistance.

†

1

INTRODUCTION
American immigration law is widely understood to consolidate power in the
political branches of the national government. The field’s central jurisprudential
feature—the doctrine of immigration “plenary power”—is taken to stand for the
proposition that the federal government has nearly unfettered authority to decide
which migrants to admit and deport from the United States.1 This authority is
embodied in the Immigration and Nationality Act, a prolix code that appears to
describe in painstakingly intricate detail the rules that govern the screening and
conduct of immigrants.2 And this power is jealously guarded by the federal
government: when Arizona recently enacted its own immigration-related legislation,
the United States took the nearly unprecedented step of suing the state, arguing that
Arizona’s statute could not stand because the national government holds exclusive
authority over the admission of immigrants.3 Given these features, it is unsurprising
that American immigration law is seldom thought to involve significant delegation of
the core power to decide who gets to live in the United States. In fact, some
scholars have argued that the nature of the immigration “plenary power” is such that
the federal government may be constitutionally prohibited from delegating its
authority to other actors.4
Despite this conventional wisdom, this Article demonstrates that delegation is
pervasive in American immigration law. The federal government rarely makes
decisions on its own about which immigrants should be admitted. Instead, it
delegates to agents outside the federal government tremendous power to select the
“types” of migrants who are admitted—to make decisions about the nature of their
labor market skills, the level of their language proficiency, their likelihood of success
in the United States, and so forth.5 Even more surprisingly, it also delegates

1 See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); see generally Stephen Legomsky,
Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255; Gabriel Chin,
Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting: The Origins of Plenary Power, in IMMIGRATION LAW STORIES (Martin &
Schuck, eds. 2005).
2

See INA §§ 101 et seq., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (2010).

See Complaint in United States v. Arizona, at 8 (July 6, 2010) (“Congress holds exclusive authority
for establishing alien status categories and setting the conditions of aliens’ entry and continued
presence.”), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/az-complaint.pdf. See also United
States v. Arizona, 10-16645, 2011 WL 1346945 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2011).
3

See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry: Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and
Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001).

4

5 In most cases, the federal government does set the overall numerical limits on migration, even as it
delegates significant power to pick among different prospective migrants. In some cases, however,
the agents are empowered to select migrants who are exempt from the quota system—and in this way
alter the overall number of migrants admitted. See INA § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2009); infra text
accompanying notes 89-92.
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significant power to these agents to control migrants once they arrive in the country,
and to decide whether they should be deported.6
In theory these immigration decisions could be given over to any of a vast
number of possible agents, ranging from individual citizens, to private organizations
like universities and religious organizations, to international entities or perhaps even
other nations. And while many different agents do play some role in American
immigration law, two prominent private agents stand out—employers and families.
Employers are given wide powers to choose which foreign workers will be awarded
coveted labor migration visas. They often also have the power to remove those
workers from the country.7 Similarly, the federal government delegates to family
members the power to select immigrants by filing petitions on behalf of their
foreign-born spouses, children, and other relatives—who without the sponsoring
family member’s petition could never legally migrate to the United States.8
Moreover, in addition to these private agents the federal government often
delegates significant screening and regulatory authority over immigrants to states and
local governments. This basic fact was overlooked in the brouhaha surrounding
United States v. Arizona, in which the U.S. government challenged an Arizona law that
criminalized certain U.S. immigration law violations, thus raising the effective
sanction from violating federal immigration law.9 Some of the commentary
suggested that Arizona had violated basic legal principles by enacting migrationrelated laws that supposedly lie outside the authority of the states. In fact, Arizona’s
attempt to strengthen the enforcement of federal law has many precedents, and in
other contexts the US. government encourages such behavior. The problem was
that, in this case, the U.S. government believed that Arizona’s law was unwise for
policy reasons and sought, in effect, to withdraw certain delegated powers so as to
curtail Arizona’s enforcement strategy.10
The American approach is radically different from that used by most other
countries. Rather than use a bottom-up, decentralized approach to admit
immigrants, these nations employ a top-down approach in which the government
determines the number and type of people who will be admitted each year either as
temporary workers or permanent migrants. In Canada, for example, the government

6 Even within the federal government there are large-scale delegations to the President that have often
been overlooked by immigration scholars. For an extended discussion of the importance of this
delegation, see Adam B. Cox & Cristina Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L. J.
458 (2010).
7

See infra Part II.

8

See infra Part III.

9

United States v. Arizona, 10-16645, 2011 WL 1346945 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2011).

10

See infra Part IV.
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uses a merit-based points system, which assigns higher points to migrants with
strong credentials, useful experience, language ability, and related characteristics.11
Approaches like Canada’s seem to set up a screening mechanism that provides
the best way of distinguishing between the types of migrants a state values and those
it does not. And, in fact, this was a criticism leveled against the U.S. system during
the last major round of congressional debates about comprehensive immigration
reform. During those debates, many advocates argued that the U.S. should shift
toward a more top-down approach like Canada’s. Indeed, one prominent proposed
amendment to the legislation would have scrapped much of our existing system and
replaced it with a points-based system similar to Canada’s.12
Given the seeming rationality of such an approach, what could justify the
comparatively decentralized nature of U.S. immigration policy? This Article argues
that delegating to agents (partial) authority to admit foreign migrants enables the
government to exploit the informational advantages of those agents. As the standard
principal-agent model suggests, individuals and institutions can obtain significant
gains by delegating authority to agents in a range of circumstances.13 In the case of
the immigration system, the U.S. government can obtain better migration
outcomes—admitting more socially valuable migrants while excluding less socially
valuable migrants—by delegating the decision-making to agents. Employers can
often do a far superior job of evaluating the productivity of foreign workers. Family
members are generally in a better position than the government to evaluate the
capability of potential migrants to integrate after arrival. And states have more
information about local immigration conditions—and vastly more information about
where individual immigrants are located—than does the federal government.
But the principal-agent model also teaches that agents can take actions that
diverge from the principal’s interests, and that principals need to construct contracts
or (in the immigration setting) rules that provide agents with proper incentives. We
argue that the employer and family sponsorship systems can been understood as
reflecting these tradeoffs. The delegation to private agents and to states and local
governments is partial. In many cases, the restrictions imposed on the agents’
decisionmaking powers can be seen as efforts to align the agents’ incentives with
those of the federal government, or at least to blunt shirking when those interests
inevitably come into conflict. Employers cannot admit workers who will inflict
certain negative impacts on the U.S. labor market.14 Family members are by
11
See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Six Selection Factors and Pass Mark,
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/skilled/apply-factors.asp; see also infra Part II.D (discussing points
systems for labor migration).

See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, http://cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/
busimm.asp.
12

13

See infra Part I.
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See infra Part II.
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definition limited to picking from a very small pool of prospective migrants—except
in the case of marriage, where complex rules discourage the agents from selling their
spousal sponsorship to the highest bidder.15 And state and local governmental actors
face a monitoring scheme designed to curb both under- and overzealous screening
behavior by those actors.
Principal-agent models can therefore help us better understand and evaluate
the structure of American immigration law. In what follows, we show how the
theory provides an important defense of some oft-criticized features of the U.S.
system. However, we do not argue that the U.S. system is the best possible. We
identify a number of features that are perverse from a principle-agent perspective,
suggesting grounds on which those features should be reformed. Moreover, the
introduction of a new way of thinking about immigration delegation raises larger
questions that are beyond this Article’s scope of inquiry—such as questions about
what other potential agents an institutional designer might employ were she
structuring the immigration system from scratch.
This Article builds on two earlier articles on what we call the second-order
structure of immigration law—the legal rules that are designed to promote certain
first-order migration goals.16 While we are interested principally in these secondorder questions, as in our earlier work we must make some assumptions about firstorder goals in order to motivate the analysis. Throughout the Article we draw these
assumptions about first-order goals from the structure of immigration law itself: they
include broad assumptions that the government would like to control the flow of
both the numbers and types of immigrants, as well as more specific assumptions—
for example, that the government would like to increase the pool of human capital
available to U.S. employers, or perhaps even promote a certain racial, ethnic, or
cultural mix among immigrants. As in our earlier work, our central interest is not the
defensibility of the particular goals we discuss. It is, instead, the relationship between
these goals and the use of delegation as a second-order design strategy in
immigration law.
Part I of this article sets out the theoretical framework. Parts II, III, and IV
apply the framework to employers, families, and the states.
I. PRINCIPALS, AGENTS, AND DELEGATION
Delegation refers to the transfer of authority from one party to another, with
the expectation that the delegate (or “agent”) will use that authority to achieve the
15

See infra Part III.B.

See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 809
(2007) [hereinafter Cox & Posner, Second-Order Structure]; Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Rights of
Migrants: An Optimal Contract Framework, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1403 (2009) [hereinafter Cox & Posner,
Rights of Migrants].
16
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goals of the other party (the “principal”). Such agency relationships are ubiquitous.
Employers delegate power to employees; governments delegate power to agencies;
firms delegate power to outside contractors. The essence of the agency relationship
is the superior information of the agent: the principal delegates to the agent in order
to take advantage of the agent’s expertise; but because the agent has better
information than the principal, the principal will have difficulty monitoring the agent
and ensuring that the agent acts in the principal’s interest. Economists and political
scientists use principal-agent models to analyze these relationships.17
In a principal-agent model, the principal hires an agent to perform a task that
benefits the principal. The agent’s preferences and the principal’s preferences are
not the same. In some models, the agent chooses between a high level of effort and
a low level of effort (“shirking”). The agent prefers to engage in the low level of
effort because it is less work, but the principal gains more from the high level of
effort. In order to encourage the agent to engage in the high level of effort, the
principal must give the agent incentives. In other models, the principal and agent
have different goals. “Shirking” now means that the agent pursues her own goals
rather than the goals of the principal; again, the principal must give the agent
incentives to encourage her to achieve the principal’s goals. In both models, the
principal cannot directly observe what the agent does and give her a reward for
engaging in a high level effort and punish her for engaging in a low level of effort. If
the principal could do this, the problem would be easily solved. The principal would
simply reward the agent for a high level of effort and punish the agent for a low level
of effort, and the agent would respond by engaging in the high level of effort.
Because the principal cannot directly observe what the agent does, the
principal can reward or punish her only on the basis of the observed outcome of her
action. But effort and outcome are not perfectly related: this is what makes it
difficult for the principal to monitor the agent directly. A high level of effort will
thus sometimes leads to a bad outcome for the principal, and a low level of effort
will sometimes lead to a good outcome for the principal. A principal can give an
agent optimal incentives by rewarding her if the optimal outcome occurs and
punishing her if the bad outcome occurs. To maximize her expected payoff, the
agent will use the high level of effort even though there is a chance that the bad
outcome will nonetheless occur and she will be punished. But many people would
turn down such a scheme. Even if the chance of being rewarded for low effort (an
unfair reward) is equal to the chance to being punished for high effort (an unfair
punishment), a risk-averse agent will be reluctant to enter into such an agency
relationship. In such situations, the principal will have to moderate the reward and
punishment to entice the prospective agent to accept the delegation—in effect,
insuring the agent against the bad outcome. This insurance blunts the agent’s
incentives, leading a rational agent to invest less effort in the task.
See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & DAVID MARTIMORT, THE THEORY
PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL (2002).
17
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OF INCENTIVES:

THE

Immigration law pervasively raises the sort of information problems that are
frequently addressed through delegation. As we have written elsewhere, migration
policy in large receiving nations like the United States presents a screening problem.18
The state would like to control the “types” of migrants who are admitted—where a
migrant’s “type” refers to characteristics of the migrant that make her “desirable” to
the state, however those characteristics or a migrant’s desirability might be defined.
For example, states often seek migrants who are highly-skilled. These migrants will
make money, contribute skills to citizens they interact with, start businesses, and help
finance public goods through their taxes. Nations also often seek migrants who
possess or are likely to invest in country-specific human capital—that is, skills that
are valuable only within the receiving country.19 These migrants include those who
speak the dominant language (or can quickly learn it), have personal connections
with existing residents, share the dominant culture’s values, and understand (or can
quickly learn) the prevailing social norms.20 For many states, such migrants—those
who have skills that are in high demand, or possess country-specific human capital,
or (ideally) both—are considered “good types.” The problem is that a migrant’s type
is hidden information. The migrant knows her type but the government does not.
The government thus faces what economists call a hidden information (or screening)
problem.
The information problems for the state do not disappear once the migrants are
selected. The state also cares about what the migrants do once they arrive. For
example, states often want new migrants to work and make country-specific invests.
But not all migrants will act in this way. States will thus worry that migrants will
arrive and shirk by underinvesting in their country-specific human capital, by failing
to integrate, or worse by entering the social welfare system or turning to crime.21
Even good types might display such bad behavior, though they are less likely to do
so than bad types. The problem for the government is that migrants who engage in
bad behavior may be difficult to detect, punish, and (if necessary) remove. The
government thus faces what economists call a hidden action (or moral hazard)
problem.
A state can address these two problems—hidden information and hidden
action—without delegating authority to those outside the national government. Ex
ante, the government can try to screen out bad types by demanding proof of work

18

See Cox & Posner, Second-Order Structure, supra note 16.

19 For the definition of country-specific human capital, see Cox & Posner, Second-Order Structure, supra
note 16, at 828.
20

See id.

See Gordon H. Hanson, The Governance of Migration Policy, 11 Journal of Human Development &
Capabilities 2, 185 (2010) (examining the fiscal incentives of high-income countries with regard to
immigration policy, and discussing how fiscal policy drives immigration policy in such nations).
21

6

and language skills, or requiring migrants to take exams before they are admitted.22
Ex post, the government can screen out bad types by relying on information
acquired after the migrant arrives—information about their success in the labor
force, their criminal record, and so forth.23 It can also try to control migrant
behavior by employing both carrots and sticks—granting rights to migrants to
provide security and encourage investments and integration, for example, or
threatening to deport anyone who cannot keep a job in order to incentivize
employment.24
Most states, including the United States, employ these approaches.25 But they
can be supplemented with delegation to agents outside the national government.
Private parties will often have superior information about how productive a migrant
might be, about how likely it is that she will put down roots in the receiving state,
and so on—about all of the attributes that the state might consider important to
identifying the “good types” from within the huge pool of potential migrants.
Employers, families, universities, religious organizations, and others might all fit this
bill. In some cases smaller units of government—like U.S. states or local
governments—will also have better information. Moreover, these various potential
agents will also often be in a better position than the federal government to monitor
the migrants and control their behavior after they arrive.
This possibility is often overlooked in discussions of immigration law. Part of
the reason, as we noted above, is that American immigration law is not generally
thought to involve much, if any, delegation of power. Instead, the federal
government is typically described as jealously guarding its “plenary power” over
immigration. The structure of the federal immigration code contributes to this way
of thinking. The Immigration and Nationality Act runs hundreds of pages, leaving
the impression that Congress has laid out, intricately and comprehensively, the rules
that govern the screening and conduct of immigrants.
To be sure, the possibility of delegation has not gone entirely unnoticed in
recent years. One of us has written elsewhere about the structure of delegation within
the national government.26 Moreover, the surge in scholarship focusing on secondorder issues in immigration law has led other scholars to identify particular, isolated
See, for example, the Canadian entrance requirement of language proficiency testing,
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/skilled/factor-language.asp.

22

23 For an extensive discussion of the choice states face between ex ante and ex post screening, see Cox
& Posner, Second-Order Structure, supra note 16.
24 For a discussion of how states can use rights to encourage investment by migrants, see Cox &
Posner, The Rights of Migrants, supra note 16.

See, e.g., INA §§ 212, 237, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227 (specifying conditions under which aliens can be
deported both for committing certain crimes or for violating the terms under which they were
admitted).
25

26

See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 6.

7

instances where immigration enforcement authority has been delegated to private
parties.27 But these papers generally conceptualize private delegation as unusual and
as focused almost exclusively on questions of enforcement—that is, the
identification of immigration violators. As we will show, delegation is not unusual or
limited to the periphery of immigration law; delegation is thoroughgoing and affects
the vast majority of immigration decisions. Moreover, delegation does not
exclusively, or even principally, concern enforcement. The national government has
given over to private parties authority to shape core selection decisions in
immigration law—to decide what types of people should have lawful immigrant
status in the United States, not just to identify those who have violated their status.
Our aim in the following Parts is twofold. The first is descriptive: we explain
how three different groups of agents—employers, family members, and sub-federal
units of government—have been given significant control over who gets to come to
the United States and over who is forced to leave, and we explore the scope and
limitations of the delegation to each group of agents. The second goal is theoretical:
we provide a framework for analyzing the trade-offs that the government faces when
it is deciding whether, and to what extent, to delegate immigration authority.
Principal-agent theory highlights the balancing act the national government faces
with respect to each type of agent. The government can take advantage of the
superior information of the agent by giving the agent some power to select migrants
and control their behavior. But because the interests of agents always diverge, a little
or a lot, from the interests of the national government, there are serious costs to
giving too much power to the agents. To show have states can combat these costs,
we draw on an extensive economics literature about designing institutions to mitigate
agency costs.
Consistent with our previous work, this theoretical framework focuses on
second-order design issues rather than first-order policy goals. It also continues to
explore the ways in which the information problems posed by immigration law are
central to the design of immigration institutions. Before proceeding, we should
emphasize that the arguments in the following Parts about the structure of
delegation within immigration law are not causal claims. The theoretical framework
we provide can help explain and justify certain patterns of delegation, but we do not
mean to suggest that the theory necessarily explains why the United States has
structured immigration delegation as it has. In some cases—such as with respect to
the spousal visa requirements—the evolution of legal rules suggests that the
government was in fact focused, at least implicitly, on principal-agent issues. In
other areas, of course, the evolution of immigration law is more likely the product of
interest group politics or simple historical happenstance. Irrespective of the origins
See Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, An Addendum to Cox and Posner: A Visa to Snitch, NOTRE DAME
L. REV. (forthcoming 2011); Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, Outsourcing Immigration Compliance, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 2475 (2009); Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 1103 (2009); Huyem Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 777 (2008).
27
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of delegation in immigration law, however, understanding delegation’s theoretical
underpinnings is crucial to evaluating the current structure and future design of
American immigration law.
II. EMPLOYERS
A. Labor Immigration Rules
American immigration law contains two tracks for labor migration. The first is
for noncitizens who intend to settle permanently in the United States—people
whom the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) defines as “immigrants.”28 The
second track is for putatively temporary workers, who are defined by the INA as
“nonimmigrants.”29 The INA sets aside 140,000 slots per year for the first group
and allocates slots according to a system of five preferences.30 The first preference is
for “priority workers” consisting of persons of “extraordinary ability,” internationally
recognized professors and researchers, and executives of corporations with affiliates
in the United States. The second preference is for professionals with advanced
degrees and exceptionally talented people in the arts, sciences, and business. The
third preference is for skilled workers in short supply and professionals holding
baccalaureate degrees. These three preferences receive most of the immigration
slots, with the fourth and fifth preferences being allocated a smaller number of visas
for religious workers, former employees of the U.S. government and international
organizations, and investors who will invest at least $10 million in the U.S. economy
and create at least ten jobs for Americans.31
Noncitizens seeking admission under the first three categories must usually be
sponsored by an employer. Some persons of extraordinary ability are excused from
this requirement, as are certain others—for example, physicians with skills in areas
where shortages exist who agree to work for at least five years.32 For those people
who are not excused, the employer must submit a petition for labor certification.33
To obtain a labor certification, the employer must prove that “there are not
sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified . . . and available at the time of
application for a visa . . . at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or
unskilled labor,” and that “the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the
28

See INA § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2009).

29

See id.

See INA § 201, 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (2009). For a general overview of the labor immigration rules,
which are often difficult to deduce from the INA itself, see DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA
DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 154-72 (6th ed. 2010);
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 161-166 (6th ed. 2008).
30

31

See WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 31, at 154-72.

32

See INA § 203(b)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2009).

33

See INA § 203(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (2009).
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wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.”34
To prove that these conditions are satisfied, the employer must advertise the exact
position—with the same duties and compensation—and show that no U.S. worker
applied for the job or those who did apply were rejected because they did not qualify
for it.
If the application of an immigrant worker is approved, she may settle in the
United States. Importantly, the immigrant is not required to stay in the position
offered by the sponsoring employer. She is admitted as a lawful permanent resident
(“LPR”), a visa status that does not limit the duration of her stay and does not
require her to work at all—let alone for her sponsoring employer—in order to
maintain her visa status.
Temporary or non-immigrant workers are those who do not intend to settle in
the United States but plan to return to their country of origin. These workers apply
for H visas, of which approximately 420,000 were issued in 2009.35 We will focus on
two types of visa: the H-1B visa for workers in “specialty occupations,” which are
those which require “a body of highly specialized knowledge;”36 and the H-2A visa
for workers who will perform “temporary (or seasonal)” work, normally in
agriculture.37
The government issues H-1B visas up to a cap of 65,000, though the number
can exceed that amount because of various loopholes and typically does.38 These
visas are reserved for employees in “specialty occupations”.39 In order to obtain H-

34

INA § 212(a)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A).

See Characteristics of H-1B Specialty Occupation Workers, Department of Homeland Security U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, Fiscal Year 2009 Annual Report, ii (2010),
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/H-1B/h1b-fy-09characteristics.pdf (providing data on H-1B visas); Randall Monger & Macreadie Barr, Nonimmigrant
Admissions to the U.S.: 2009, Annual Flow Report, Department of Homeland Security Office of
Immigration Statistics, 4,
(2010), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/
ni_fr_2009.pdf (providing data on H-2 visas and the breakdown by type of visa). We should note that
federal estimates of the size of the H visa programs vary. DHS issued two reports for FY09 that
reached different estimates for the total number of H-1B visas granted, and its estimate for H-2A
visas granted (approximately 206,000) differs from the estimates by the Department of State
(approximately 100,000) and the Department of Labor (approximately 250,000). For a collection of
these varying figures, see http://www.globalworkers.org/PDF/061110_H2_2009.pdf.
35

INA § 214(i)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1)(A) (2009). See also Weissbrodt & Danielson, supra note __
at 200-207.

36

37INA

§ 218, 8 U.S.C. § 1188 (2009). See also Weissbrodt & Danielson, supra note __ at 159-164.

See Department of Homeland Security Office of Immigration Statistics, Characteristics of H-1B
Specialty
Occupation
Workers
3
(2010),
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/H-1B/h1b-fy-09characteristics.pdf.
38

39

See infra note 59.
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1B visas, workers must obtain employer sponsorship.40 Employers are required to
file a Labor Condition Application which states that the worker will be paid at least
as much as existing employees in the same occupation, that the position will not
harm similarly situated U.S. workers, and that the employer is not involved in a labor
dispute.41 H-1B status lasts for three years and may be extended to six years. If a
person with H-1B status wants to continue working in the United States after the
end of six years, he or she must leave the country for one year and then reapply for
the visa. However, an H-1B visa holder may apply for permanent immigration and
will enjoy certain procedural benefits compared to other applicants residing inside or
outside the United States.42
A temporary worker with H-1B status faces serious restrictions on job
mobility: the baseline rule is that her visa is valid only as long as she remains
employed with the employer who sponsored her.43 Unlike an immigrant worker,
therefore, she cannot quit and change jobs whenever she wants. As we will explain
more fully below, however, there is some limited visa “portability.”
A
nonimmigrant worker with H-1B status may apply for a job with an employer who is
willing to sponsor her for a new H-1B visa, and to take that position as soon as the
employer files a petition.44
Agricultural employers who need seasonal labor may take advantage of the H2A program. Workers are admitted for a limited period of less than one year.45 The
workers do not need any special qualifications—they may be unskilled—but the
employer must show that “there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are able, willing,
and qualified, and who will be available at the time and place needed”46 and that the
employment of H-2A workers will “not adversely affect the wages and working
conditions of workers in the U.S. similarly employed.”47 H-2A workers must be paid
the prevailing wage that would be paid to U.S. workers.48 Like H-1B visa holders, H2A migrants lack job mobility. But their visas are even more restrictive: during the
term of their visas, H-2A holders are prohibited from seeking new jobs with
different sponsoring employers.49
40

INA § 214(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c) (2009).

41

INA § 212(n), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n) (2009).

42

See Pub. L. 106-313, 114 Stat. 1251 (2000).

INA § 214(n), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(n) (2009) (if an H-1B holder leaves the employer that sponsored his
H-1B and the petition of his next prospective employer is denied, his authorization status ceases).
43

44

INA § 214(n), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(n) (2009).

45

20 C.F.R. § 655.103; see generally http://www.dol.gov/compliance/guide/taw.htm.

46

INA § 218(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1)(A) (2009).

47

INA § 218(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1)(B) (2009).

INA § 218(c)(3)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1188(c)(3)(B)(i) (2009); see also 20 C.F.R. § 655.10 (describing
process to determine prevailing wages for temporary labor certification purposes).

48

49

See INA § 214(n), 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 214(i)(1).
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The central feature of this system is the partial or constrained delegation of
authority to employers to select permanent immigrant workers and temporary
nonimmigrant workers. Employers are given primary authority to select workers
from the vast pool of noncitizens who seek work in the United States, but they must
meet several criteria—including chiefly the requirements that the worker have
significant qualifications and will not compete with U.S. workers. Another feature of
the system that is of interest is that of portability: immigrant workers have portability
while nonimmigrant workers for the most part lack portability.
B. The First-Order Goal of Employment Migration Policy
To understand why the government might delegate screening authority to
employers, we first need some sense of why the government would want to admit
any labor migrants. The first-order goals of labor migration are likely quite complex,
but it is reasonable to assume that the government seeks labor migrants who are
productive and have preferences for public goods that are close to those of the
median citizen. It is also reasonable to assume that the government wants to avoid
migration that reduces the wages of Americans and causes job loss. But how can the
government both seek additional workers—which by augmenting supply necessarily
depress wages—and avoid migration that reduces wages?50
One possibility is that migrants enter industries for which there are literally no
qualified American workers who will work for any wage. But there are probably few
industries for which this is true—translation of materials from or into obscure
languages may be example. It is sometimes said that U.S. citizens will not work as
gardeners or nannies or nurses, but that statement is clearly false; the problem is that
U.S. citizens will not work in sufficient numbers at the prevailing wage rather than at
some higher wage. To make sense of American labor migration policy, we might
imagine that some domestic industries are periodically hit by shocks that greatly
augment the demand for their products and hence the demand for labor. The classic
example was the dot-com boom which resulted from the development of the
Internet.51 As the firms competed for software engineers, the wages of American
software engineers skyrocketed. The migration of vast numbers of foreign software
engineers, mainly from South Asia, would, of course, suppress domestic wages
relative to what they would have been in the absence of the migration—but those
wages would have risen more slowly rather than declined—and the migration would
not have caused unemployment.52 For that reason, resistance among workers to the
50 One theoretical possibility is that migrants will augment the demand for domestically produced
goods, leading to higher wages for U.S. workers, although not necessarily those in the same industry
as the migrant.

See John Schwartz, Dot-Com is Dot-Gone, And the Dream With It, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 2001,
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/25/style/dot-com-is-dot-gone-and-the-dream-with-it.html (discussing the dotcom boom and its subsequent bust).
51

52 See Norman Matloff, High-Tech Cheap Labor, WASH. POST, Sep. 12, 2000, at A35 (discussing lobbying
by computer industry CEO’s to raise the quota for H-1B work visas in response to increased demand
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migration would likely have been minimal. At the same time, employers, consumer
groups, and businesses that use computer products would have a strong interest in
lower prices (or higher profits, in the case of employers) and for that reason would
support the migration.53 Thus, permitting short-term migration following exogenous
shocks that increase the demand for labor is perhaps the easiest case from the
government’s perspective.
There are several problems with this theory. First, the quotas for temporary
employment visas are in practice quite sticky. While the quotas are occasionally
changed by Congress—the dot-com boom being one example—for the most part
they remain unchanged year after year, even while labor market conditions are
fluctuating significantly.54 Second, the same industries tend to receive most of the H1B and H-2A workers year after year.55 This makes it look like the programs are
more the product of interest group politics and inertia. Third, a theory grounded in
labor market shocks cannot account for the large-scale system of permanent labor
migration. Permanent migration appears instead to reflect a goal of improving the
aggregate stock of human capital.
As this thumbnail sketch suggests, the wage and employment effects of labor
migration are extremely complicated and contested. Nonetheless, the INA appears
to reflect the twin goals of (1) increasing the labor supply in response to labor
shortages (that in theory are most likely to arise in response to exogenous shocks to
the labor market), and (2) upgrading the stock of human capital available to domestic
employers even in the absence of any shortage of workers. In what follows, we
explore what structure of delegation can best advance these first-order goals.

for high-tech laborers during the dot-com boom); John P. De New & Klaus F. Zimmermann, Native
Wage Impacts of Foreign Labor: a Random Effects Panel Analysis, 7 J. of Population Econ. 2, 177 (1994)
(examining the labor market impacts of foreign workers on native worker salary and unemployment
figures).
See Norman Matloff, High-Tech Trojan Horse: H-1B Visas and the Computer Industry, Center for
Immigration Studies Backgrounders and Reports (Sept. 1999) (discussing the tech industry’s lobbying
efforts to raise the H-1B quota and the resulting legislation); S. Res. 1440, 106th Cong. (1999)
(proposed legislation to increase the H-1B visa quota; H.R. 2687 (1999) (proposed legislation to
extend the duration of H-1B visas).
53

See Pub. L. 106-313, 114 Stat. 1251 (2000) (raising the H-1B limit to 195,000 for FY 2001 to 2003).
For annual reports on H-1B quotas and petitions, see the annual reports produced by U.S. Citizenship
and
Immigration
Services,
available
at
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid
=9a1d9ddf801b3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=9a1d9ddf801b3210VgnVCM
100000b92ca60aRCRD.
54

See John Miano, H-1B Visa Numbers: No Relationship to Economic Need, Center for Immigration
Studies Backgrounders and Reports (June 2008) (examining the consistency of the breakdown of H1B visas allocated by industry).
55
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C. The Advantages from Delegation to Employers
Employers will generally have better information than the government about
the quality (in particular, productivity) of potential applicants. Employers can better
evaluate credentials, such as diplomas, and the quality of the match between the
applicant’s talents and the employer’s needs. In addition, the employer will have
better information about the local labor market—the availability of U.S. workers
who could perform the same job. It is possible, although less certain, that employers
will be in a better position than the government to evaluate the applicant’s
preferences about public goods, which may be revealed through interviews and other
parts of the application process.
Employers do not always have informational advantages. In general, the
advantages will be greater if the government is interested in using labor migration to
ameliorate transitory labor shortages within particular job sectors, or where the
government has independent reasons to want to structure labor migration as a
matching of prospective immigrant employees to specific employers. Where the
government is interested instead in using labor migration to augment the supply of
human capital within the state, the informational advantages of the employers are
somewhat weaker. This is because the firm-specific job requirements about which
the employer has clearly superior information are less relevant if the goal is to pick
migrants who have skills or training that will, over the long run, benefit the state.
Employers may also have fewer informational advantages when the
government seeks to expand the pool of what is generally referred to as “unskilled
labor.” In the immigration code and the economic literature, unskilled workers are
typically those without specialized training or educational credentials. Sometimes
these workers are admitted for jobs that require “skill” even though they involve no
specialized training or educational prerequisites—jobs where some workers will be
vastly more productive than others. Cane cutters admitted to Florida as part of the
H-2A program are often said to constitute such workers. But in other cases
unskilled workers admitted to perform jobs that require little skill of any sort, and for
which the productively differences among employees are negligible. In such cases
the employers have little to contribute to the screening process, because there is few
skills differences among workers for the employer to suss out.
A government that wants to capitalize on the informational advantages of
employers is therefore likely to delegate to employers more—or will delegate in a less
constrained fashioned—for temporary migrants than for permanent migrants, and
for skilled migrants than for unskilled migrants.
D. Disadvantages of Delegation: Misalignment of Preferences
Employers do not necessarily or even usually share all the interests of the
government. As we have explained above, the government likely seeks labor
immigrants (or nonimmigrants) who will advance productivity, share the policy
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preferences of the majority, and be able to live and prosper in the United States.
Employers seek workers who advance productivity alone. In addition, the
government may have reasons to favor certain industries or groups of workers;
employers as a group obviously do not and could not share these interests.
To see the problem, consider a system where the government determined the
number of migrants to be admitted in a given year—say, 100,000—and then
distributed slots at random to employers or sold them by auction. Employers would
then choose to fill the slots however they wanted to. Employers would choose
migrants with the highest level of productivity for positions that need to be filled.
But in most cases employers would not consider the migrants’ policy preferences—
for example, whether they share American civic ideals or instead harbor authoritarian
and intolerant political preferences. Employers will also not take account of the
various costs that workers may impose on society if they quit or are fired. In the
case of permanent migrants, these costs may be considerable because unemployed
workers can often benefit from social services.56 But even in the case of temporary
migrant workers, these costs will often be high because workers may overstay their
visas. A specialized translator of technical manuals into Urdu may not be able to
find another job if he is fired, and instead become a public charge.
Employers could shirk in other ways. Employers will invest resources into
screening where the marginal costs equal the marginal benefits for the employer, not
for society. An intensive screening procedure will not be cost-effective for the
employer if it can identify highly productive people with adequate probability simply
on the basis of their diplomas. The employer may expect to employ the worker for,
say, five years on average, in which case the downside from misjudging the
productivity of the worker will be limited to a lost opportunity for five years. But if
the worker can stay beyond five years, then an intensive screening process will
benefit future employers (who, in the case of low-productivity workers, will be
spared the cost of screening, if the first employer had screened them out). However,
the first employer has no incentive to take these benefits into account.
Finally, when the worker arrives, the employer will have strong incentives to
encourage the worker to invest in firm-specific human capital, not country-specific
human capital. At the end of the three or five years, the worker may therefore be
highly productive at the workplace for which she was sponsored, but not at any
other workplace in the country. And the employer has no incentive to teach her
Lawful permanent residents are prohibited from receiving some federal benefits until they have
resided in the United States for five years. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, § 403, 8 U.S.C. § 1613. But other federal benefits
are available immediately, and state government often extend the social safety net to LPRs prior to
their eligibility for federal benefits. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note __, at 1228-32 (listing initial
exceptions to the five-year bar and describing subsequent statutes that relaxed the bar in additional
situations) ; id. at 1246-47 (explaining that “more than half of the states provide benefits to at least
some noncitizens who are ineligible for federal services.”).
56
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skills that will make her a productive citizen. For this reason, an employer-based
sponsorship system is more suitable for temporary than for permanent migration.
These considerations suggest a rough prediction about the appropriate degree
of delegation for different types of foreign workers. Because permanent workers
produce benefits and costs for the state well beyond their period of employment
with the sponsoring employer, delegation should be greater for temporary workers
than for permanent migrants. This point reinforces our earlier argument that
because employers’ information advantages over the government will be greater for
temporary migrants than for permanent migrants, delegation should be greater for
temporary migrants.
E. The Structure of Employment Delegation
From society’s standpoint, the optimal immigration law will take advantage of
the employer’s superior information while preventing the employer from “shirking.”
But how can the government capitalize on the employer’s superior capacity for
screening migrants and simultaneously prevent the employer from choosing migrants
who serve the employer’s private interest but harm the public’s interest? The above
discussion suggests a few design principles—such as delegating greater authority over
temporary than permanent labor visas. More generally, we can see that immigration
law will sometimes need to give the employer an incentive to screen migrants well by
offering a reward, while at the same time constrain the reward or impose sanctions in
order to deter the employer from choosing privately beneficial but socially harmful
workers. The following discussion considers how immigration rules might be
designed to accomplish those goals.
1. Nondelegation: Merit-Based Point Systems
To begin, let us consider a baseline system without delegation. A number of
countries use a merit-based point system to screen (permanent) migrants,57 and such
an approach has been proposed for the United States as well. Under a 2007 bill,
applicants would be assigned points according to various criteria that emphasize
domestic labor demand, skills, education, and compatibility.58 For example, an

Examples include Canada, see Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Six Selection Factors and Pass
Mark, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/skilled/apply-factors.asp, New Zealand, see The Skilled Migrant
Category Points Indicator, http://www.immigration.govt.nz/pointsindicator , and Australia, see What
is the Points Test?, http://www.immi.gov.au/skilled/general-skilled-migration/points-test.htm. For
an overview of point systems, see Demetrios G. Papademetriou & Madeleine Sumption, Rethinking
Points Systems and Employer-Selected Immigration, European University Institute, Migration Policy
Institute (June 2011).
57

S. 1639, 110th Cong. (2007) (proposed legislation to provide for comprehensive immigration
reform), discussed in Aleinikoff et al., Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy, 461-62 (6th ed.
2007).
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applicant who could be employed in a “specialty occupation”59 would receive 20
points; an applicant who could be employed in a “high demand” occupation would
receive 16 points; and an applicant who could be employed in the sciences and
related fields would receive 8 points. Applicants also would receive points for U.S.
work experience, English-speaking ability, relatives in the United States, success on a
U.S. civics exam, and advanced education attainment—for example, 20 points for an
advanced graduate degree, 5 points for a certified vocational degree.
Point systems are attractive because they enable a country to choose people
directly on the basis of criteria that matter from a social standpoint. As we saw,
employers may seek highly productive workers but they do not take account of the
costs and benefits of workers for society outside the workplace (including after they
quit and take a new job). Importers of unskilled agricultural labor, for example, may
not care that the workers cannot speak English; but these workers may have trouble
integrating themselves into American society without English language skills. Under
a point system, the government makes the tradeoff between productivity and
assimilability directly and embodies the tradeoff in an algorithm that better serves the
public interest.
However, we are skeptical of the utility of point systems. In a market
economy, the highest-valued workers are not necessarily those with the highest
educational attainments. The highest-value workers are those in industries where
demand greatly exceeds the supply of workers. When demand spikes (or supply
declines), wages will rise as well, and that will encourage U.S. workers to move into
the industry, so even when labor shortages open up, they can close quickly. The
government can try to determine where the shortages are located by conducting
surveys and engaging in statistical analysis, but it cannot foresee the future as well as
employers with experience in the field, and will at best be able to aggregate
information in a crude fashion. The case for delegation rests on the assumption that
employers are in a better position to understand their labor needs than the
government is. The government can superimpose other requirements (such as
English language ability) in order to minimize the risk that employers will choose
people who are ill equipped to live in the country or integrate, but there is no reason
to abandon delegation altogether.60

The INA defines a “specialty occupation” as an occupation that requires “theoretical and practical
application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree
in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the U.S.”
INA § 214(i)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1) (2009).
59

Papademetriou & Sumption, supra note 57, at 3, criticize points systems because arriving workers
often are unable to find jobs. This is consistent with our point that the points systems do not
necessarily select the most valuable workers, but their immediate concern could be addressed with a
dual requirement that migrants who are qualified on the basis of points must still obtain a job prior to
receiving a visa.
60
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Even if the government is interested not only in solving the problem of labor
shortages, and instead also wants to add human capital to the country, it is not clear
the state is best equipped to pick those who will be the most economically
productive and socially beneficial. Certainly it is easier for the state to do so with
respect to highly educated people, because at least in those contexts there are
objective criteria like awarded degrees and English language ability. But these are
often crude measures, in the same way that LSAT scores and undergraduate GPA
only crudely predict who will become the most successful lawyers. The United
States government is not well equipped to determine whether a degree in economics
from a university in Taiwan is equivalent to a degree in economics from universities
in Norway, South Africa, or Peru. It is even less able to evaluate work experience in
different types of firms in different places around the world. Employers have
specialized experience in evaluating candidates for employment, and therefore are in
a stronger position than the state to determine the quality of their human capital.
2. Employer Sponsorship
One could argue that even if employers have better information about migrant
types than the government does, the best system would be one in which employers
provide that information to the government, and then the government acts on it.
The government could, for example, conduct surveys of employers’ labor needs,
aggregate the information, and the allocate visas on the basis of what it learns.
The problem with such a system is that employers have no incentive to
provide accurate information to the government. All employers benefit from a large
labor pool, and so all employers will have a strong incentive to tell the government
that they face labor shortages even when they do not. The government might admit
low-value workers as well as high-value workers, but employers could engage in
sorting if and when they decide they need to hire more people, and they can thus
avoid these sorting costs if they decide that they do not need to do so. If the
government follows the advice of employers, it will either admit too many workers
or allocate visas randomly rather than to the most productive workers.
Employer sponsorship solves this problem by requiring employers to bear the
some of the cost of admission. Employers must incur the cost of identifying
particular migrants if they want the U.S. government to issue visas in their industry,
and of complying with bureaucratic procedures. Employers will incur these
sponsorship costs only if they expect a benefit from them, which means that they
actually expect to hire the worker and obtain returns high enough to cover the costs.
Sponsorship rules should greatly reduce admission of low-value workers.
3. Temporary and Permanent Workers
In the U.S. system of delegation, one major distinction is that between
temporary and permanent workers. Temporary and permanent workers have
different purposes: in theory, temporary workers augment the labor supply after an
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exogenous shock causes wages to rise, while permanent workers augment the
population with people who have valuable skills and politically compatible
preferences. Employers will internalize more of the costs and benefits of temporary
workers simply because temporary workers are more likely to remain with the
employer during their entire stay, while permanent workers are more likely to find
another job. Thus, it makes sense to give employers who hire temporary workers
greater screening authority than employers who hire permanent workers.
The law reflects this conclusion in three ways. First, the quality standards for
admitting permanent workers are higher than the standards for admitting temporary
workers.61 Thus, an employer may screen in a relatively low-quality workers for three
to six years, but not permanently. Second, although the employer of temporary
migrants must prove that the applicant will receive the prevailing wage62 and that her
presence will not harm U.S. workers,63 it need not attempt recruitment of Americans
for the position, as is required by the labor certification process for permanent
workers.64 Third, workers admitted on a temporary basis must generally leave the
country early if they lose their position with the sponsoring employer.65 This means
that employers can admit temporary workers only to the extent that those workers
continue to work for the sponsoring employer. There is no such condition for
employers who screen in permanent workers.
4. Portability
Under the INA, temporary labor visas significantly restrict the labor mobility
of migrants. For some visa categories workers are categorically prohibited from
quitting and finding a new job in the United States. The visa is tied to the
employee’s sponsoring employer, and he cannot be sponsored for a new visa unless
he departs the United States. The H-1B visa relaxes these restrictions a bit, but all
temporary visas come with limited “portability” at best.

For empirical evidence, see U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Approval and Denial
Statistics
for
I-140
Immigrant
Petitions
for
Alien
Workres,
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid
=2be702798785e210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=cdfd2f8b69583210VgnVCM1
00000082ca60aRCRD (listing approval and denial rates for petitions for classification as an “Alien of
Extraordinary Ability,” the first preference category for permanent workers; the yearly acceptance rate
ranges from 49% to 62% over the past six years); cf. supra note 11 at ii (listing an approval rate for H1B temporary visas of 86% in FY09).
61

62 INA § 218(c)(3)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1188(c)(3)(B)(i) (2009); see also 20 C.F.R. § 655.10 (describing
process to determine prevailing wages for temporary labor certification purposes); see also INA §
212(n)(3)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(3)(A)(i) (2009).
63

INA § 218(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1)(B) (2009).

64

INA § 212(n)(1)(G)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(G)(i) (2009).

65

INA § 214(n), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(n).
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These post-entry restrictions on labor mobility have complex effects on the
incentives of the employer and the temporary worker. Because the worker often
cannot quit and find a new job, the employer can underpay her after she has arrived,
and in this way earn rents on the admission.66 By the same token, because potential
migrants know that they may be underpaid and without recourse, they may be
reluctant to apply for visas in the first place. The employer and worker may mitigate
this effect by contract but, as always, it is not clear that a contract can anticipate all
future contingencies or that the worker will, as a practical matter, be able to enforce
it after she has returned to her home country.
The lack of portability might be defended as a method for rewarding
employers for undertaking the task of screening on behalf of the government. The
employer must invest in finding foreign workers that suits its needs, and then must
underwrite the cost of the migration process. An employer will not incur these costs
unless it can be guaranteed a return—in the form of wages that are below the
prevailing American wages. To be sure, employers face a similar problem when they
try to recruit domestic workers: they may incur considerable expense in finding and
recruiting workers, hire them, and then lose them to a competitor a short time later.
But this problem is more significant for migrant workers. In domestic contexts,
prospective employees apply for positions because they want the position. In the
visa context, however, they often have twin motivations: they want the job, but they
also want the visa. Once they have received the visa, therefore, there should be a
higher probability that they will choose to leave the initial employer than there would
be for an employee hired in a purely domestic context. Thus, by coupling one’s
ability to enter the United States to one’s ability to get a labor visa, the INA
introduces a distortion into the employer-employee matching market—in the form
of strategic behavior by prospective employees. This distortion might lower the
employer’s incentive to screen, and so this distortion must be offset with the
portability rule, which permits the employer to obtain above-market rents. In
addition, if the employer rather than the temporary migrant receives the surplus, that
money will ultimately benefit (mostly) Americans (shareholders, customers who
receive lower prices) rather than (mostly) foreigners, who will benefit from
remittances and the worker’s expenditures after she returns to her country.
However, the lack of portability also creates a deadweight loss: workers may
have difficulty moving to employers where they would be more productive. Even if
the visa system were restructured so that employees could pay prior employers to
release them, this anticipated cost will suppress the incentive to apply for temporary
work in the first place. The employer will also have a perverse incentive to
overinvest in the worker’s firm-specific human capital rather than in her countryspecific human capital, so as to minimize her ability to find another sponsor and
switch jobs. Moreover, the incentive system is crude. Employers receive a payoff
that increases with the productivity of the worker, which will encourage employers to
66

See Papademetriou & Sumption, supra note 57, at 4.
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choose the best workers but not necessarily the workers who produce positive
externalities in the form of conformity to the law and other characteristics or
activities.
Possibly reflecting this concern, in 2000 Congress amended the portability rule
so that temporary workers can move to new employers when they file a petition for a
new H-1B visa rather than when their petition was accepted (as required under the
old rule).67 This amendment mitigates the negative effects of lack of portability but
does not eliminate them.
5. The Labor Shortage Requirement
The central question in immigration applications is whether the applicant seeks
a position for which there is a labor shortage. In some cases, the government lists
occupations for which it believes that shortages exist.68 In other cases, the employer
must prove that a shortage exists by showing that it cannot find a U.S. worker willing
to fill the position even though the employer offers the position at the “prevailing
wage.”69 The prevailing wage standard is nonsensical. If a prevailing wage exists,
then U.S. workers would be willing to fill the job (at that wage). And if the employer
must pay the prevailing wage to the migrant (as it must), then the employer gains no
benefit by hiring that person—hiring the person does not reduce labor costs. We
suspect that employers manipulate the prevailing wage requirement by paying foreign
workers less than U.S. workers would be willing to accept.70
One theory for a labor shortage requirement is that, in the absence of such a
requirement, employers would sponsor migrant workers who impose high negative
externalities on society, for example, people likely to become criminals or public
charges, or people who will likely fail to assimilate in other ways. To minimize these
costs, the government might authorize employers to sponsor migrant workers only
when they generate a relatively high surplus—which will be partly enjoyed by
employers and partly transformed into public revenue through the tax system. But if
this is the goal of the labor shortage requirement, it would need to be transformed,
so that it made economic sense. As we discussed in Part II.B., a revised labor
67 See Immigration Services and Infrastructure Improvements Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-313, 2000 Stat.
2045, codified at INA § 214(n), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(n) (2009).
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shortage requirement could limit visas except when an exogenous shock increases
the demand for labor well beyond historical levels, as in the case of the dot-com
boom in the 1990s. When labor demand exceeds supply, the surplus generated by
hiring will be greater than normal, and thus the tax revenues benefiting society will
be greater than normal as well. These increased tax revenues would offset the
negative externalities from the migration.
On this approach, however, the labor shortage requirement is poorly designed
and should be changed. Instead of requiring the employer to prove that it cannot
find a U.S. worker at the “prevailing wage” (which is impossible), the government
should require the employer to show that the wages of U.S. workers in the relevant
industry have increased at historically unprecedented rates. In theory, the precise
threshold would be the rate at which the extra tax revenue (and other benefits) from
hiring a migrant exceed the expected negative externalities associated with that
migrant. In practice, the government would need to use a cruder threshold, but we
expect that one could be formulated, based on historically abnormal wage increases
and similar factors.
Another view is that the current system is adequate because its overall effect is
to impose a cost on employers, which will discourage them from hiring marginal
migrant workers who would impose negative externalities greater than their benefits.
If the labor certification requirement is a sham, then employers must satisfy it by
paying a lot of money to lawyers, consultants, and others, so as to provide the
documentary evidence that will satisfy the immigration authorities. This is, in effect,
a tax. It follows that employers will decline to sponsor migrant workers who
contribute only marginally to their profits, and will focus their energies on
sponsoring migrant workers who contribute a great deal to their profits—
professionals like computer programmers rather than, say, factory workers.
Assuming that negative externalities among potential migrant workers do not vary
much, then a system that admit high-surplus workers and rejects low-surplus workers
is more likely to be socially beneficial than one that does not distinguish them.
However, if this theory is correct, then the system can certainly be improved.
First, society would do better if employers paid an actual cash tax to the treasury
rather than wasted money on paperwork. Second, the tax should not be a constant
amount but should be a function of the negative externalities that a migrant worker
imposes on society. If some migrant workers impose high negative externalities,
then the employer should be required to pay a high tax; when migrant workers do
not impose negative externalities, the tax should be low or zero.
There is an obvious tension between encouraging employers to sponsor
migrants and penalizing them for sponsoring migrants because they create negative
externalities. In Part II.E.4, we suggested that the portability rule encouraged
employers to sponsor high-value workers by giving employers a large portion of the
surplus generated by employment. If employers went to the expense of sponsoring a
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worker, and then the worker immediately quit and found work with a competitor,
employers would not sponsor workers in the first place. But if we believe that
workers impose negative externalities, then we should tax employers who sponsor
migrants. How do we resolve this tension?
The answer is the employer must capture enough of the surplus that it is
worthwhile to sponsor the migrant but that some portion of the surplus must also go
to the state. As we noted above, the portability rule is probably too crude for this
purpose. If the employer can simply negotiate a long-term contract with the migrant
worker at a wage that is below the U.S. rate, then the employer will gain from the
sponsorship even if it must pay a separate real or implicit tax. Meanwhile, that tax is
necessary so as to ensure that only the highest-value migrants are sponsored.
6. Ex ante and Ex post Screening: The Transition from Temporary to Permanent
Status
A traditional rule is that foreign workers who seek temporary status must attest
that they do not intend to seek permanent residence. They must lack “immigrant
intent”71 in order to receive the visa. A related rule was that holders of H-1B visas
had to have a permanent foreign residence.72 Both rules have eroded over the
years.73
These rules were likely driven by the concern that foreign workers would game
the system by first obtaining a temporary visa and then, once in the United States,
taking advantage of a path to citizenship. For example, it would be easier for
someone in the United States for three years to arrange a sham marriage with a U.S.
citizen than for someone living in a foreign country where access to potential
American spouses is more limited. Or some people might plan to overstay their visa
and hope for an amnesty, which periodically recurs. Or they might hope that contact
with American employers will make it more likely that they will be able to persuade
an employer to sponsor them for a permanent labor visa. To screen out such
people, the law required evidence that they planned to return to their home country
after their visa expired, and had a financial reason—such as a foreign residence—to
do so.74
Why might these rules have eroded? One possible reason is that often the best
evidence of a person’s suitability as a permanent resident comes from her experience
on American soil. Indeed, many people who spend three years in the United States
may voluntarily return home because they decide they prefer to live in their native
country. Among those who seek permanent residency, their experiences in the
71
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United States—whether they obtained and kept a job, paid taxes, avoided crime,
learned English, were integrated into their communities—provide useful evidence as
to the likelihood that they will continue to be successful as a permanent resident. As
we have discussed elsewhere, the immigration system has therefore gradually
undergone a transformation to a two-period approach, where migrants have more
limited rights during a probationary period, successful completion of which facilitates
application for permanent residence.75
The delegation question reemerges with respect to second-period evaluations
of people who have already entered the United States on temporary visas and seek to
remain permanently. Again, the state could directly evaluate the migrant by
monitoring her behavior while on American soil. The state could question her
directly about her activities, such as whether she committed crimes, held a job,
learned English, made friends, and so forth; and in many cases, her answers can be
verified by giving her tests and examining government records (for example, criminal
records). The state can also delegate or partly delegate this ex post screening
decision to agents such as employers, and indeed this is what happens in the United
States. An employer effectively provides for the removal of the visa holder by firing
her before her time has expired (unless she finds another sponsor); it can also help a
temporary worker obtain permanent status by sponsoring her for a green card.76
Why would the government give the employer the de facto power to deport
migrant workers through the act of firing them (or failure to sponsor them for green
cards)? One possibility is that if the migrant is not a suitable worker for the
sponsoring employer, then she is most likely not a suitable worker for any U.S.
employer. If the employer has better information about the worker’s human capital,
this rough judgment may well be good enough for public policy purposes. In
addition, if the employer fires the worker not because of poor quality but because of
poor economic conditions, then there is a risk that the worker will become a public
charge or depress wages or contribute to unemployment during an economic
downturn, when there is often political hostility toward foreign workers. This view
that temporary admission can serve as probationary period, which permits better
evaluation of the “quality” of the migrant, can be contrasted to a more popular view,
which is that temporary migrants should be given permanent residence because they
develop affiliations in the United States.77 If this view is correct, then the two-period
approach imposes an unacceptable hardship on migrants, and instead they should
either be denied entry or given permanence residence from the start. Whatever the
75
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merits of this idea, one should be clear that it has significant costs, as it deprives the
state of important information for evaluating potential migrants, whose experiences
in the state can provide a basis for determining their suitability as citizens.
F. Choosing and Coordinating Multiple Agents
We have so far abstracted from a significant problem with delegation. By
assuming that the government delegates to a single employer, we have avoided the
question how the government should choose among the thousands of employers
who could serve as screening agents.
Imagine that the government has determined that 100,000 slots should be
made available for permanent workers.78 All employers would apply for these slots.
Under a baseline randomization system, the slots would be randomly assigned to
employers. If one million employers each apply for a single slot, then each employer
would be given a 1/10 chance of obtaining a slot. Of course, if employers can apply
for more than one slot, they will strategically apply for more slots than they need in
order to increase their chances of winning at least one in the lottery. In order to
avoid these types of strategic behavior, employers’ applications would be subject to a
ceiling, for example, one that is determined by the size of the firm.
A randomization system would be quite crude, because it does not ensure that
the highest-value workers end up at the highest-value employers. Those employers
who obtained a slot would search out the highest-value workers for them, but it is
possible that those workers would be more suited for different employers who did
not win the lottery, or that different worker-employer matchups would be more
productive. This problem could be ameliorated if the slots were tradable.
Employers with higher-value opportunities would then buy slots from employers
who won the lottery.
Current immigration law in the United States resembles a randomization
system. All employers may seek slots; if they seek more than are available, the slots
are distributed at random.79 There are a few additional screening elements that
increase the cost for the employer. Employers must show that the migrant is (in
most cases) highly educated and skilled, and hence highly productive. In addition,
the employers must obtain a labor certification that shows (or purports to show) that
employment of the migrant will not lower the wages of Americans or cause
unemployment. The high cost and trouble of negotiating the immigration
bureaucracy may serve as a limited screening mechanism, ensuring that employers
will not attempt to obtain slots for workers who fall below a threshold of
We could also imagine a system in which the government delegated to employers the decision how
many migrants to admit in the first place, but such an approach is sufficiently remote to present-day
realities that it can be safely ignored.
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productivity. There is a great deal of skepticism about whether the labor certification
system works as intended, however.80
A more direct approach would be for the government to auction off the slots.
Now, the highest-value employers would purchase the slots, and those highest-value
employers would import the highest-value workers for their positions. Although
auctions must be carefully designed, and can be gamed, an auction would be superior
to the baseline randomization system. Alternatively, the government could auction
off visas directly to potential migrants.81 The most productive migrants would bid
the most for the visas, assuming that they can borrow against their future earnings (if
not, perhaps they could borrow from the government of the receiving state which
could use its power to tax to secure repayment).
The literature addresses the possibility of workers bidding for visas, and has
not considered an approach in which employers rather than workers bid for visas.82
An employer-centered approach has a number of advantages. Employers will face
fewer capital constraints than foreign workers, who without a source of capital may
not be able to bid very high for visas. Employers also have considerably better
information about employment opportunities in the United States than potential
migrants do.
III. FAMILIES
Modern immigration law also delegates significant screening authority to
family members.
A. Family Reunification Rules
Today family reunification is a core feature of American immigration law.
Historically, however, it played a much smaller role. When Congress first enacted
general numerical restrictions on immigration law in the wake of World War I, the
quota system was based on national origin.83 While some limited family-based

Concerns about whether the migrant will conform to American norms and values are addressed in
other ways—for example, the removal of those who commit crimes. See Cox & Posner, Second-Order
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migration was permitted,84 the modern migration categories—under which the vast
majority of visas are allocated on the basis of labor demand or family connections—
did not exist.
In 1965, Congress abolished the national origins quota system in the HartCeller Act85 and put in place a new framework for allocating visas. The new
framework relied primarily on family-based migration: nearly three-fourths of the
visas were allocated for qualifying relatives. Today, nearly half of all the visas
awarded for permanent residence each year are awarded under this system.86
The family-based visa allocation rules are exceedingly intricate, involving a
number of different “preference” categories and complex quota formulas.87 To
understand the basic structure, however, it is important to recognize that all familybased visas must begin with a petition by a sponsoring relative already living in the
United States.88 Thus, one must distinguish between two important questions: (1)
which existing residents are permitted to sponsor their family members for visas; and
(2) who may be sponsored for a visa by a resident family member.
Both citizens and lawful permanent residents (LPRs) are permitted to sponsor
relatives for family-based visas. But the code treats citizens more favorably than
LPRs. First, citizens are exempt from numerical restrictions on visas when they seek
to bring in their “immediate family members”—defined as spouses, unmarried minor
children, and (in some circumstances) parents.89 LPRs, on the other hand, are
subject to quota restrictions even for these immediate family members.90 Second,
citizens have larger allocations under the quotas for relatives who are not immediate
family members. Therefore, citizens have an easier time than LPRs bringing in
siblings, parents, and adult children.

84 The Quota Act in 1921, while specifying quotas for immigrants based on national origin,
preferenced certain relatives of U.S. residents, including spouses and unmarried minor children, see
JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925 330
(1963). This system was in place from 1921 until 1965.
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Relatives who may be sponsored by citizens or LPRs include spouses, both
minor and adult children, parents, and siblings.91 Before 1965, the little family
migration available was limited to spouses and minor children. Hart-Celler
dramatically expanded the types of family relationships that could serve as the basis
for a visa application. Nonetheless, with the exception of those noncitizens who
qualify as immediate family members, prospective beneficiaries of family-related
visas are subject to quotas. The numerical limit applicable for any particular migrant,
which is far too complex to explain in detail, turns on three principal factors.92 First,
it turns on the nature of the familial relationship, with spouses and children generally
receiving preferential treatment over brothers and sisters. Second, the quota
depends on whether the sponsoring resident is a citizen or LPR; LPRs currently face
a multi-year backlog for spousal and child admissions, while citizens can bring in
spouses and minor children without regard to the quotas. Third, the quota turns in
part on the country from which the relative is emigrating.93 The employment- and
family-based preferences are subject to per-country limits which place ceilings on the
number of otherwise qualifying migrants who may come from a single country in any
given year. The limit, which is roughly 25,000 per country,94 has led to backlogs of
more than 10 years for some relatives immigrating from Mexico and the
Philippines.95
B. Possible Justifications for Delegating Admissions Authority to Family Members
Why might a state give citizens (and sometimes lawful permanent residents)
the option of selecting new immigrants from within the pool of their eligible family
members? Unlike labor migration, where the information advantages of prospective
employers are straightforward, delegation to family members presents a more
complicated picture. Consider three possible reasons why a state might employ a
family-based migration system: to respect the significance of family relationships to
people’s lives and therefore to privilege family reunification as an independent value;
to speed the integration of new immigrants; and to promote the migration of people
with racial and cultural characteristics that match the existing polity.
Each of these justifications for the system might help explain why the state
would delegate screening authority to resident family members. But each also raises
important agency issues.
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1. Family reunification
To the extent the state authorizes family migration because of a desire to
permit citizens to live near to those they care about deeply, delegation provides some
information about the closeness of the relationship. In almost all cases, the citizen
or LPR must file a visa petition for a family member to receive an immigration
benefit. And in the case of spouses, the U.S. resident obviously must choose to
marry the person for the qualifying relationship to exist. The sponsoring resident
has far better information than the government about how close she is to her
relatives. After all, parents and children aren’t always close. Neither are brothers or
sisters. It might waste limited immigration slots to permit family members to enter
the U.S. without asking the resident to reveal whether she cares sufficiently about the
relationship to file a petition on the family member’s behalf.
Of course, if respecting close family relationships, or intimate relationships
more generally, is the state’s principal concern, the current rules clearly fall short.
They define qualifying family relationships in a way that privileges mainstream
cultural understanding of family. They are also biased against those whose most
significant relationships are not with family members at all. These shortcomings
could be ameliorated by a broader delegation. Each citizen (or LPR) could be given
a small number of immigration slots and permitted to sponsor whomever he wished
for a visa. But closeness is surely not the state’s only concern. Such a delegation
would undercut the state’s ability to use the immigration system to promote
traditional notions of family—a power the state has employed regularly throughout
immigration history.96
Perhaps even more importantly, delegating to existing citizens the power to
pick one or more migrants would exacerbate a serious agency issue that the current
system of family migration already faces. The agency problem is this: in a world
where the migration benefit is very valuable, the government’s agent may simply sell
the benefit. The current system addresses this problem in part by limiting the scope
of prospective migrants who can be sponsored by an existing citizen or LPR. The
number of overseas family members is much smaller than the total number of
noncitizens who might like to purchase a green card. The current system also relies
for the most part on qualifying relationships that cannot be manufactured. Under
most circumstances, one has no control over the identify of one’s parents or siblings.
And while citizen children can sponsor their noncitizen parents for visas, the code
prohibits minor children from doing so97—thereby preventing noncitizens from

See, for example, the policing of marriage practices among Chinese immigrants during the 19th
Century, the differential treatment of mothers’ and fathers’ relationships with their children, and the
exclusion of same sex couples in recent years.
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coming to the United States and giving birth to a citizen in order to acquire an
immediate immigration benefit.
Nonetheless, there is one qualifying relationship that is voluntary: the
relationship of spouses. This raises a serious concern that citizens will sell
immigration benefits by entering into sham marriages.
Historically the government tried to police this behavior by its agents by
monitoring their marriage choices directly, inquiring into whether a marriage is “real”
or instead fraudulent. The spousal immigration rules did this principally by relying
on ex ante screening—that is, by attempting to identify fraudulent marriages only at
the point of admission, when the visa would be granted. Relying on ante screening
had serious problems. The government could ask intrusive personal questions to try
to figure out whether the couple had entered into a “real” marriage rather than a
phony one. But it was relatively easy for couples to dupe the immigration service—
as Gerard Depardieu and Andie McDowell did in the 1990 movie Green Card—
simply by living together briefly and learning the details of each other’s life.98
To combat this problem, the 1986 Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments
revised the immigration code to establish a two-stage screening system for spousal
migration.99 Today, a newly married couple cannot get an ordinary green card for the
noncitizen spouse. Instead, the spouse can initially obtain only a “conditional” LPR
visa. Unlike other visas conferring lawful permanent resident status, the conditional
LPR visa expires after two years and is stamped prominently with its temporary
status.100
The conditional status introduces ex post screening into the spousal visa
process. At the end of the two-year conditional period, the spouses must jointly file
papers with the federal government in order to lift the conditional status.101 The
filing requires that the couple include information about employment history (like
pay stubs), place of residence, and so forth. They are sometimes also required to
attend a joint interview. These steps provide additional information to the
government that it can use to determine whether the marriage is valid—information
that would not have been available for newlyweds at the point when the visa initially
was issued.102 Rather than relying entirely on an easy-to-game and subjective
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interview process, the government can acquire more objective evidence about
whether the couple has lived together, shared financial obligations, and otherwise
lived the joint life that most married couples live. A couple in a sham marriage can,
of course, also live a joint life for this two-year period in order to pass the ex post
screen, but it is much more costly for them to do so than for a legitimately married
couple. Thus, the new system imposes relatively lower costs on valid marriages than
on fraudulent marriages, and in theory can help align the incentives of the citizenagents.103
The development of the marriage fraud rules highlights the fact that there will
often be two ways that the government might try to reduce principal-agent slack
when it delegates immigration authority. It can directly monitor the agent’s
performance. This will often be difficult, however, because the private information
that justifies delegating to the agent in the first place also makes it difficult for the
government to evaluate the agent’s performance. Therefore, the government will
often be more successful if it can structure immigration law to create incentivecompatible contracts for its agents—contracts that provide greater rewards to the
agent, or are less costly to comply with, when the agent acts consistently with
government’s interests. The evolution of the spousal immigration rules reflects a
move away from the first strategy and toward the second.
2. Integration and social externalities
Family-based migration can also be seen as a way of promoting integration
among recent arrivals. To be sure, there are many ways a state might use its
admissions system to promote integration. Many states—particularly states with
relatively homogenous racial or ethnic compositions—have historically used the race
or ethnicity of entering migrants as a proxy for their assimilability.104 Beyond the fact
that many believe race-based immigration criteria to be morally repugnant, such an
approach has obvious practical limitations in diverse countries such as the United
States. Family-based admissions may do considerably better than this crude proxy.
For as we have explained elsewhere, immigrants may be able to integrate more
quickly and easily if they have existing family in the receiving state who can provide

103 The sponsor’s continuing control over the immigrant’s lawful status in the country does give the
sponsor significant control over the immigrant. In the employment context this raised the possibility
that employers would exploit immigrants who lacked visa portability. In the marriage context this
raises concerns about exploitation or abuse by the sponsoring spouse. To ameliorate this problem,
the immigration code includes a limited exception joint petition requirement. The code also includes
a special visa category for those who are the victims of abuse at the hands of their sponsoring
spouses. See INA § 216(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a.(c)(4) (2009) (for the “Hardship waiver” requirements).
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social ties, financial support, and valuable information about the immigrant’s new
home.
On this account, the state can also capitalize on the private information and
interests of citizens (and LPRs) by delegating to them to pick immigrants from
among their family members. As we explained above, citizens have better
information about whether they are close to their qualifying relatives. Here that
information is useful because citizens are much more likely to provide support to
immigrating relatives if they feel close to them. Permitting relatives to apply for
family-based visas without a sponsor, therefore, would undermine the usefulness of
the family migration system as a means of promoting integration. Relatedly, citizens
are more likely than the government to have a good sense of which close family
members are likely to flourish in the United States. Since these citizens also likely
take to heart the interests of these family members, they may be unlikely to
encourage a family member to migrate if it is likely that person will be miserable in
the United States, and will become dependent on her U.S. relatives for financial
support. Indeed, citizens will likely encourage foreign relatives to immigrate to the
United States precisely when they expect their relatives to prosper and be able to
contribute financially and in other ways to the family in the United States.
But there are two shortcomings with this approach. For one thing, a citizen
can pick only from among his own qualifying relatives. Even if he will do a better
job than the government of picking successful immigrants from among those
relatives, there is no reason he will have a better sense of whether his own family
members will be better bets than other citizens’ family members, or than other
prospective migrants who have no family members in the United States.
An even more serious problem is that, like employers, resident family
members might ignore some migration costs about which the government cares
deeply. While a citizen may discourage her brother from immigrating if she thinks
he will be miserable, her private calculation about his happiness may ignore various
public values the state wishes to promote. For example, the state may want to pick
migrants who already know English or will quickly learn it. But the sister may not
worry about whether her brother is likely to learn English if she thinks that he will be
able to get along fine while still speaking only his native language. Or, more
generally, the state may worry about the fiscal burden the migrant could impose
down the road if he ends up not being successful in the labor market. His sister
might discount this risk more than the state because she will not bear the cost
herself.
To ameliorate these problems, the state might simply take some discretion
away from existing residents by putting additional restrictions on which family
members they can sponsor. For example, the state could require that qualifying
family members pass a language test before receiving a visa. Or the state could
prohibit a citizen from sponsoring his spouse if their marriage did not conform to
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certain norms regarding sex equality or sexuality. The INA does not impose the
former restriction on family reunification, but it does impose the latter. Spouses in
plural marriages cannot obtain a spousal visa.105 Same-sex couples have also
historically been prohibited from qualifying for such a visa.106 Other countries have
been even more aggressive about policing the private choices of citizens related to
family reunification. Consider, for example, Denmark’s recent changes to its family
reunification rules for spouses. Denmark has long permitted citizens to bring their
spouses into the country. Several years ago it imposed a new restriction on these
visas—making them unavailable if one of the marriage partners is under twenty-four
years of age.107 The restriction on qualifying marriages was designed to prohibit
family reunification on the basis of (and thereby generally discourage) arranged
marriages among young, religious migrants—whom the state feared were likely to be
Arab and Muslim.108 Worried that resident’s private family reunification decisions
would be insensitive to public values—in Denmark’s case, the state’s concern about
the development of a large, homogenous bloc of religious Muslim migrants—the
state removed some discretion from its citizen-agents.
Rather than limiting discretion, the state might also try to force the petitioning
family member to internalize the public values that matter to the state. For instance,
if the government is worried about the potential future fiscal burden of a new
migrant, it could require the petitioning party to bear some of the costs if the
immigrant ends up being unable to support herself. The INA does something like
this, requiring sponsoring relatives to pledge to support financially the relatives they
are sponsoring.109 One difficulty with this approach is that it may be difficult to
enforce such pledges after the fact.110 And even if the pledges are enforceable,
financial stability is a rather crude measure of integration or other values about which
the state cares—especially in family migration contexts, where the decision to admit
is less directly connected the labor market and fiscal issues that underlie the
105See, generally, Scott Titshaw, The Meaning of Marriage: Immigration Rules and Their Implications for Same-Sex
Spouses in a World Without DOMA, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 537, 583-586 (2010) (describing
the general invalidity of plural marriages under immigration law in the U.S.).
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See Helena Skyt Nielsen et al., The Effect of Marriage on Education of Immigrants: Evidence from
a Policy Reform Restricting Spouse Import (Inst. for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper Series No.
2899, 2007), available at http:// ssrn.com/abstract=1000373.
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(2009).
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109 See INA § 212(a)(4)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(C)(ii) (2009) (stating that family-sponsored
immigrants are inadmissible unless an affidavit of support by the sponsor has been submitted); INA §
213A (describing required affidavit of support).

See Charles Wheeler, The Affidavit of Support and Sponsorship Requirements, 98-06 Immigr. Briefings 1
(1998) (discussing the difficulties of enforcing the affidavit of financial support); Robert A. Martino,
Sponsor Liability for Alient Immigrants: the Affidavit of Support in Light of Recent Developments, 7 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 314 (1970) (discussing the uncertainty of the legal enforceability of the affidavit of financial
support).
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employment visa allocations. Thus, in practice it may be quite difficult to bring the
sponsor’s incentives in line with state’s.
3. Racial Homogeneity
The goal of racial homogeneity does not fit neatly into our informational
account of the modern family admissions system. If the state’s goal is to admit
migrants of particular races, the state does not face a significant information
problem. Race is conventionally considered a highly visible characteristic.
Therefore, the state can regulate the racial composition of the migrant pool by
picking races explicitly, as the United States did in the Chinese Exclusion Act.111 Or
it can do so using proxies like nationality, as the United States did for many years in
the national origin quota system.112 There is no obvious informational advantage to
delegating the screening decision to family members or other agents.
Still, it is often said that the creation of the modern system of family
reunification in the United States was motivated in part by a desire to promote the
migration of people with racial and cultural characteristics that match the existing
polity. From 1921 to 1965, American immigration law regulated the racial and
cultural composition of the migrant pool relatively directly through the national
origins quota system.113 When pressure finally led Congress to abolish the national
origin quota system in 1965, many legislators supported the modern family
reunification rules because they believed those rules would largely replicate the
results of the quota system.114 The family reunification system would replace a
centralized allocation system with a delegation to multiple agents. But because these
agents were thought likely to pick family members who shared their own racial,
ethnic, or cultural backgrounds, the composition of the migrant pool would not
change significantly.

The Chinese Exclusion Act, May 6, 1882 (22 Stat. L. 58). The Chinese Exclusion Act was not a
nationality-based exclusion. It excluded all Chinese laborers—where “Chinese” was defined in the
statute as a racial category rather than a nationality. See id. Hence the law covered a person of
Chinese descent born in Peru in the same way it covered a person born in, and immigrating from,
Shanghai.
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112 See JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925 330
(1963) (describing the U.S. nationality quota system implemented in 1921).

This system allocated immigration slots to each country on the basis of the number of people from
that country who lived in the United States in 1910. The quotas were designed deliberately to try to
fix the ethnic composition of the United States as it existed during the first decade of the twentieth
century. See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM,
1860-1925 330 (1963).
113
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AMERICA 268 (2006); Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New
Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 273 (1996) (examining the history
surrounding the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act).
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On this account, delegation appears to be driven by a desire to obfuscate the
effects of the admissions rules. The idea is that the public will not understand the
consequences of delegating to family members or, if they do eventually realize that
the system replicates the racial composition of the existing polity, will not hold
legislators responsible for that result. In the congressional context, obfuscation and
blame-shifting is a frequent explanation for agency delegations. The same logic
appears to be at work here—though there remains the important question whether
the public was actually duped.
C. Multiple Agents, Collective Action, and Path Dependency
While we have focused so far on the information and incentives of individual
sponsoring family members, a central feature of the family migration rules is that
they delegate immigration authority to a large number of potential sponsors. As with
the labor migration rules, this feature changes significantly the consequences of the
delegation.
Consider the idea that the family reunification system was designed to replicate
the national origins quotas—delegating to multiple agents who would pick new
migrants who shared their racial and cultural backgrounds. While this idea appears
to have motivated some legislators who voted for the system, things did not work
out as these legislators had hoped. Today, petitions for family-based immigration are
dominated by persons of Asian and Latin American descent—a quite different mix
of migrants than would have been selected under the old national origin quotas.115
Understanding how the family migration rules might have contributed to this state of
affairs helps highlight the way in which the structure of delegation embedded in the
family-based immigration rules—where the state gives limited admissions authority
to a large number of agents—can promote or undermine the goal of admitting an
ethnically or culturally diverse set of migrants.116
A rule permitting a state’s existing residents to petition for the admission of
their family members contains an implicit feedback mechanism. Foreign born
In 1965, the flow of LPRs was made up predominantly of Europeans: xx% of new green card
recipients were from Europe, x% were from Latin America, and x% were from Asia. Today, x% are
from Latin America, x% from Asia, and only x% from Europe. See Profile of the Foreign-Born
Population in the United States: 2000, 11 (U.S. Census Bureau 2001) (for the breakdown of
immigrants by country of national origin over time), http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p23-206.pdf.
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As we have explained in other work, there are plenty of reasons why a state might have preferences
about the aggregate composition of the pool of arriving immigrants. For example, promoting
heterogeneity in the migrant pool might facilitate integration and reduce the likelihood the migration
results in the large scale social exclusion of an identifiable racial group. While diversity may also come
with costs—which explains in part the longstanding debates about the virtues and vices of
heterogeneous versus homogenous polities—for present purposes we remain agnostic about that
question. Instead, we are interested in how that the disaggregated structure of family admissions
influences the composition of the pool of arriving immigrants. See Cox & Posner, The Rights of
Migrants, supra note 16, at 1438.
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residents are much more likely than native born citizens to have family abroad. They
are also more likely than native born citizens to marry noncitizens (many of whom
will either be living abroad or be living in the United States without a green card).117
Consequently, family-reunification rules delegate admission authority to multiple
agents, but the agents are principally foreign born residents.
In short, the migrants who enter in period 1 become a large faction of the
people to whom power is delegated in period 2.118 This creates a path-dependency in
the structure of delegation. The path-dependency would be strongest if family
connections were the only basis for entry—for then all of the migrants entering in
period 1 would have been admitted by the family reunification rule. But even if
there remain other bases for admission, such as labor visas, the large fraction of
migrants admitted to the United States because of family connections ensures that
the feedback mechanism is significant.
The fact that early migrants get to pick later migrants does not itself determine
the diversity effect of the delegation. Whether this feedback mechanism results in a
diverse set of delegates depends significantly on the composition of the migrant pool
in the early periods. If the migrants admitted in the first periods after the rule’s
introduction are diverse, their admission will make it more likely that the pool of
later migrants are also diverse. But if a homogenous pool of migrants is admitted in
early periods, it becomes increasingly unlikely that the migrants admitted in the
future under the system will compose a diverse pool.
This makes the system quite sensitive to shocks during the early periods. If
migration during the early period is quite diverse, the system is likely to converge to
one that selects a diverse pool of migrants over time (so long as a period 1 migrant is
likely to pick a period 2 migrant similar to herself along whatever dimension we are
evaluating diversity). If migration during the early period happens to include a more
homogenous group of migrants, the system is likely to replicate that homogeneity
over time. In the United States, it appears that just such an early period shock to the
composition of the migrant pool is in part responsible for long term, persistent
changes to the demographic effects of the family migration system. The years
immediately following the adoption of the family quota system saw an unanticipated
117 See Profile of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2000, 33 (U.S. Census Bureau
2001) (for native and foreign-born intermarriage statistics), http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p23206.pdf; Sharon M. Lee & Barry Edmonston, New Marriages, New Families: U.S. Racial and Hispanic
Intermarriage, Population Bulletin Vol. 60, No. 2, (Population Reference Bureau
2005)http://www.prb.org/pdf05/60.2newmarriages.pdf (finding that in 2000, about 92% of foreign-born
residents who married, married other foreign-born residents); Matthijs Kalmijn, Intermarriage and
Homogamy: Causes, Patterns, and Trends, 24 ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 395-421 (1998).

There is a related general feedback inherent in all immigration systems, where today’s migrants
become tomorrow’s citizens and voters who will control the future content of immigration law. The
mechanism we describe here is different because it is driven by the current immigration rules, rather
than by the possibility that immigration law will change in the future because of the political
preferences of current migrants.
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surge of migrants from Latin America and Asia.119 The reason for the surge is not
fully understood. But whatever its causes, it created a large pool of recent migrants,
many of whom had overseas family members they wished to sponsor for visas under
the new system. This set in motion a path-dependent process whose effects are still
felt more than four decades later. As with labor migration, this highlights the
importance of paying close attention to the disaggregated structure of delegation in
immigration law.
IV. STATES
Recent events have reinvigorated longstanding debates about the role of
states in American immigration law. Arizona, Georgia, Alabama, and other states
frustrated by the failure of federal immigration reform have passed their own statutes
related to immigration enforcement.120 In an unusual move, the federal government
has sued Arizona, arguing that the state has no authority to legislate in an arena
traditionally reserved to the federal government.121
The controversy in Arizona might be taken as evidence that the federal
government does not want states and local governments involved in immigration
enforcement. But the opposite is true. In recent years the federal government has
increasingly delegated authority to states to screen immigrants. And this delegation
is nothing new. Since the birth of modern immigration law in the 1880s, the federal
government has often allowed state and local officials to decide which noncitizens
could enter and remain in the United States.
Why would the federal government delegate immigration screening authority
to states? One important possibility is that states and local governments have better
information than the federal government about two matters relevant for screening

119 See Profile of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2000, 11 (U.S. Census Bureau
2001) (for the breakdown of immigrants by country of national origin over time),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p23-206.pdf.
120See

S. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. Apr. 23, 2010); Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and
Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Alabama Laws Act 2011-535 (H.B. 56); Illegal Immigration Reform and
Enforcement Act Of 2011, 2011 Georgia Laws Act 252 (H.B. 87); Labor and Employment, 2011
South Carolina Laws Act 69 (S.B. 20); 2011 Indiana Laws (S.B. 590); 2011 Utah Laws (H.B. 497); see
also Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. Times, A1, April 23, 2010
(discussing S.B. 1070 in Arizona and similar statutes in other states); D.I.Y. Immigration Reform¸ N.Y.
Times Editorial, Mar. 19, 2011, WK9 (discussing Utah’s H.B. 497 and the trend of states passing
immigration reform statutes)..

United States v. Arizona, 10-16645, 2011 WL 1346945 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2011). Federal courts have
enjoined the implementation of portions of the recent state enactments. See id.; Georgia Latino Alliance
for Human Rights v. Deal, 1:11-CV-1804-TWT, 2011 WL 2520752 (N.D. Ga. June 27, 2011); Kim
Severson, Parts of Georgia Immigration Law Blocked, N.Y.Times, June 28, 2011 (discussing pending
litigation against several states’ recent immigration legislation).
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decisions.122 First, state and local law enforcement agencies often have superior
access to information about immigration violators. Second, states and local
governments have better information about the local effects of migration. This Part
first surveys the landscape of delegation to the states and then discusses these twin
possibilities.
A. The Role of States in Federal Immigration Law
1. Formal Screening Criteria
The Immigration and Nationality Act’s formal criteria for admission and
deportation delegate authority to states by incorporating into these criteria the
content of state law. State law thus often determines whether a noncitizen can
obtain a visa, or whether she will be deported.
To see this, consider the family migration system. Federal immigration law
provides an immigration benefit for the spouses of citizens and lawful permanent
residents. As we explained above, a citizen’s spouse is treated more favorably than
almost any other immigrant; she is eligible for admission as a lawful permanent
resident solely on the basis of her marriage to an American citizen, and her visa
application is exempt the complex quotas that apply to the vast majority of migrants
who enter the United States under other admission rules. A spouse of a lawful
permanent resident is subject to the quota system for family migration, but she too
becomes eligible for a green card by virtue of her marriage.123
Immigration law incorporates state family law into its understanding of who
counts as a “spouse” for purposes of this valuable federal immigration benefit.
While the code does not directly define the term “spouse,” courts have concluded
that a person can be a spouse only if the couple is validly married according to both
the law of the state in which the marriage was performed and the law of the state in
which they reside (or intend to reside, if the spouse is coming from overseas).124
Therefore, variations in state marriage law can affect a noncitizen’s eligibility for a
visa. Historically, this reliance on state law mattered most in instances where states
differed over the age of consent, or the marriage of related persons.125 Today,
however, the most significant difference between state marriage laws concerns gay
marriage. While these differences have until recently been unimportant because
federal law prohibited same-sex couples from receiving any federal benefit on the
122 It is likely the case that some of the delegation to states is born of necessity. Providing a spousal
immigration benefit without relying at all on state family law would be extremely costly: it would
basically require the creation of a federal family law. Nonetheless, much of the delegation to states—
particularly recent delegation in the enforcement arena—is hard to explain on this ground.
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basis of their marriage,126 the Obama administration has recently announced that it
believes the federal prohibition is unconstitutional.127 For a same-sex couple,
therefore, the availability of a green card for a noncitizen spouse may soon turn on
whether the state where the couple lives (or wants to live after the noncitizen spouse
immigrates) permits same-sex couples to marry.
Federal immigration law also incorporates state criminal law. For example, a
noncitizen becomes deportable if he is convicted of, among other things, “rape,”
“murder,” or a “crime involving moral turpitude” (though the latter counts only if
committed within five years of entry).128 Convictions under state law count, but of
course different states use the same label to criminalize different conduct. The crime
of rape does not include the same elements in every state, and in many states the
formal category of rape has been superseded by a broader offense of “sexual
assault.” Immigration law could provide federal definitions of these crimes and
thereby render differences in state criminal codes irrelevant. Instead, however,
immigration judges and federal courts have long followed an approach—known as
the “categorical approach”—that makes the decision about criminal deportability
turn on the way these crimes are defined in state criminal law, rather than just the
conduct of the noncitizen.129
126 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (Sept. 21, 1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C.
§ 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).

See Letter from Attorney General to Congress on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage
Act, February 23, 2011 (announcing President’s decision “that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage
Act, as applied to same-sex couples who are legally married under state law, violates the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment,” and his instruction to the Department of Justice not
to defend the statute in pending litigation). Prior to the decision of the Obama administration to
decline to defend the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, a same-sex couple that married
in one of the states permitting such marriages were barred from obtaining an immigration benefit by
DOMA. In the wake of the decision not to defend the statute, however, the state of DOMA’s
enforcement in the immigration context has been changing rapidly. Because the Administration took
the position that it would continue to enforce DOMA even while declining to defend it, Citizenship
and Immigration Services has refused to accept visa applications filed by same-sex couples.
Nonetheless, the Administration has stayed some (though not all) pending immigration decisions
involving claims of spousal immigration benefits made by same-sex couples. Julia Preston, Confusion
over Policy on Gay Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 2011; Julia Preston, Justice Dept. to Continue Policy
Against Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2011 These decisions have led some judges to suspend
deportation in other cases involving same-sex couples as well. See Julia Preston, Judge Gives Immigrant
in Same-Sex Marriage a Reprieve From Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2011. For a general discussion of
the President’s decision to enforce but not defend DOMA, see Aziz Huq, When Should
Unconstitutional Federal Laws be Enforced (but not Defended)?: The Practice of Departmentalism
and Section 3 of the Defense Against Marriage Act (working paper 2011).
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Like the incorporation of family law, the incorporation of state criminal law
into the criteria of admissibility and deportability delegates screening authority to
states by making admission or deportation turn on the formal content of state law.130
However, the delegation of authority is at least formally constrained by an implicit
equality norm: states can use policy considerations to screen out migrants only if the
same rule is applied to citizens. For example, if a state wants to screen out foreign
same-sex spouses of citizens, then it also must deny same-sex marriage rights to
citizens. This requirement places a serious constraint on this form of delegation—
the implications of which we take up below.
2. Enforcement
In addition to delegating to states by incorporating state law into immigration
law’s formal screening criteria, the federal government has frequently asked (or
required) states to play a part enforcing those criteria.131 State involvement in
enforcement dates back all the way to the first large-scale immigration restrictions
adopted by the federal government—the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882.132 When
this Act was passed, no federal immigration bureaucracy existed to enforce the law.
So Congress turned to local officials. These officials, working in San Francisco and
other ports of entry, would interview arriving migrants to determine whether they
were subject to exclusion. While federal power was not entirely absent from this
process—for example, immigrants whose admission was denied could file a habeas
petition in federal court—local officials were frequently front-line enforcers during
this early period.133
As the federal bureaucracy expanded, the role of states shrank. But over the
past few decades, the federal government has increasingly turned again to states as
enforcement agents. The paradigmatic modern example is enforcement authority
delegated pursuant to § 287(g) of the immigration code.134 Enacted as a provision of
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, § 287(g)
authorizes the Attorney General to enter into agreements with states and local
governments to enforce immigration law. Today there are nearly 100 such
conduct covered by the federal law’s definition of a CIMT. A noncitizen’s deportability will thus
hinge on how the state has drafted its criminal law.
Whether states would actually manipulate the structure of state criminal law or family law in order
to influence the screening of migrants is an important question we take up below. See infra text
accompanying notes 153-162.
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agreements, and they authorize two principal types of enforcement activity. The
majority of the agreements embody a jail screening model: these agreements, such as
the one Los Angeles County entered into in 2005, authorize local officials to screen
arrestees for immigration violations when they are booked into jail, and then issue
detainers against suspected violators.135 A minority of agreements authorize local
officials to screen for status and issue detainers during ordinary policing
operations—a street-level enforcement model.
Complementing § 287(g) is the Homeland Security Department’s new Secure
Communities initiative.136 This program, known colloquially as SCOMM, is an
information-sharing initiative rolled out in 2008. Traditionally, whenever a person is
arrested and booked by a state or local law enforcement agency, his fingerprints are
taken and forwarded electronically to the FBI. The FBI compares those prints
against various national criminal information databases that return a “hit” if the
person has a criminal history or outstanding warrants. Under SCOMM, the federal
government forwards to DHS the fingerprints already being routed to the FBI; DHS
then compares the person’s fingerprints against a database designed to identify
persons who have outstanding immigration violations, such as persons who are
unlawfully in the country because they have overstayed their visas, or because they
been previously deported and have not been legally re-admitted.137 If the database
identifies an arrestee as a potential immigration violator, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) notifies the local law enforcement agency and may place a
detainer on the person.138 The detainer requires the local agency to hold the person
for forty-eight hours in order to permit ICE to transfer the person to federal custody
for the initiation of deportation proceedings.139 SCOMM has already been rolled out
in more than 1,400 local jurisdictions,140 and is projected to reach nationwide

See, e.g., Lance Pugmire, Immigration Check at Inland Jail Is OKd, L.A. Times, Sept. 21, 2005, at
B3 (discussing agreements between federal immigration officials and Los Angeles and San Bernardino
counties allowing local law enforcement officials to screen for illegal immigrants).
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coverage within a few years.141 It therefore covers a much broader swath of the
country than do existing 287(g) agreements.142
SCOMM’s information sharing system is similar in one sense to the formal
incorporation of state criminal law into federal immigration law: both delegate
screening authority to states and local governments by making screening decisions
depend on an outcome in the state criminal justice system. But SCOMM is different
in two important respects. First, the state action that triggers screening is arrest, not
conviction. Second, the determination of inadmissibility or deportability is
unconnected to the arrest decision. Under the INA’s criminal grounds of removal,
the state conviction can make a noncitizen removable. Under SCOMM, the arrest of
a noncitizen does not affect her deportability as a matter of formal law. Instead, it
provides an opportunity for the federal government to identify and apprehend an
otherwise deportable noncitizen.
B. Identifying Removable Noncitizens
1. The basic information advantage
States have two different sorts of information about immigration violators.
First, states are in a good position to identify noncitizens who are removable by
virtue of criminal convictions because state and local law enforcement agencies
already investigate and prosecute most crimes in our federal system. When a state
convicts a noncitizen of a crime that might make her removable, she is often brought
to the attention of the immigration authorities through jail-screening programs or
other programs of cooperation between states and the federal government. Because
the state has both information about the nature of the noncitizen’s criminal
conviction and physical custody over him, it is much easier for the state to flag
noncitizens whose convictions might make them deportable under § 237 or
inadmissible under § 212 of the immigration code.143
Second, states are also in a good position to identify noncitizens who are
deportable because of immigration status violations rather than because of criminal
141 See http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-dep.pdf for SCOMM nationwide usage projected
through 2013. Some states, however, have attempted to withdraw from SCOMM. See Peter H.
Schuck, Three States Short of a Secure Community, N.Y. Times, Jun. 22, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/opinion/23Schuck.html.

According to ICE, state and local jurisdictions cannot opt out of Secure Communities, see Secure
Communities:
Get
the
Facts,
Immigration
and
Customs
Enforcement,
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/get-the-facts.htm.
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143 See INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2009) (grounds of deportability); INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(2009) (grounds of inadmissibility). While the grounds of inadmissibility may sound like they apply to
noncitizens seeking to enter the country, they often apply to noncitizens who are already living in the
United States. This is because the inadmissibility rules apply to anyone who has not been “admitted,”
and noncitizens who enter the country without inspection have not been admitted for purposes of
federal immigration law. See INA 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (defining “admission”).
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conduct.144 This is because state and local officials make many, many more police
stops and arrests than does the federal government. In theory, every arrest provides
state and local law enforcement authorities an opportunity to collect information on
people’s identities. This identification information can be used by the federal
government to determine whether the arrestee is living in the United States in
violation of immigration law—because he sneaked across the border, overstayed his
visa, or violated some more technical requirement of immigration law.145 From the
federal government’s perspective these encounters are essentially free. The only cost
is the cost of comparing the identification information collected by the state with
information the federal government has about immigration violators. Without these
encounters federal officials would have to go out and try to locate immigration
violators on their own, using costly workplace raids, roving patrols along the
highways in border areas, passenger screening by ICE agents on trains and buses, or
other strategies.
From an information perspective, SCOMM and § 287(g) differ in two
important ways. In one way SCOMM capitalizes on more local information. For
reasons we explain below, SCOMM has much wider geographic coverage, with more
than eight times as many local governments already participating.146 Wider
participation means more information for the federal government. In another
respect, however, SCOMM ignores some information local officials might possess.
SCOMM relies on local officials for an arrestee’s identity, but not for information
about immigration status. The arrestee’s status is evaluated on the basis biometric
match with a federal database of immigration violators. This will lead to plenty of
false negatives, because many noncitizens who are living in the United States in
violation of immigration law have no fingerprints in the federal database that would
lead to a hit (those who have entered without inspection and not previously been
removed are a good example). In contrast, local officials screening for status under
§ 287(g) agreements can base their screening decisions on other grounds, such as the
arrestee’s responses to questions about where he was born and how he entered the
country.147

While tens of thousands of noncitizens are deported each year because their criminal convictions
render them deportable, far more are deported for status violations unrelated to criminal convictions.
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It is possible, of course, that law could prohibit the collection of such identification information
during stops and arrests. At least in the arrest context, few constraints appear to exist in practice. We
focus on arrests here for that reason—and because SCOMM, which we discuss below, is an
information collection system triggered by arrest rather than simply by a stop.
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have mutually signed 287(g) agreements with ICE).
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2. The agency problem
Our explanation of states’ information advantage assumes that the federal
government wants to retain for itself the decision of which “types” of noncitizens to
admit or remove. (As we have explained elsewhere, the federal government often
does not wish to deport every person living in the United States in violation of
immigration law.)148 States are useful only because they can help the federal
government locate noncitizens who fit the federal government’s criteria. This
arrangement raises two familiar agency issues. First, state and local officials might
make mistakes that federal officials would not. Second, and perhaps more
interestingly, state and local agents with different preferences than the federal
government might use their authority to skew enforcement priorities within
immigration law. States like Arizona that want less immigration will flag noncitizens
that the federal government would otherwise not want to remove. Other states like
Illinois will do the opposite, withholding information regarding noncitizens that the
federal government would prefer to remove.
SCOMM and 287(g) represent different institutional approaches to mitigating
these concerns. From the perspective of the principal—the federal government—
SCOMM has some significant advantages over 287(g) that reduce both the risk of
error and bias by the state and local screeners. These advantages may help explain
why the federal government has recently moved aggressively to expand SCOMM,
while 287(g) is used on a much more limited basis.
Consider first the risk of error. Section 287(g) arrangements generally require
that the agents possess far more expertise than does SCOMM. Under 287(g), local
officers are deputized to make the initial screening decision, deciding on the basis of
their knowledge of immigration law whether a particular person is a noncitizen who
is in violation of immigration law.149 This screening might take place during an
interview in a county jail.150 Or, where local law enforcement officials have been
authorized to make arrests for civil immigration violations, the screening might take
place on the street or during a traffic stop.151 Because the initial screening decision

148 See Cox and Posner, Second-Order Structure, supra note 16, at 844 (discussing the way that pervasive
underenforcement can function as part of an ex post screening system).
149

INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2009).

150See,

for example, the 287(g) resolution passed by Prince William County, Virginia in 2007, requiring
officers to check the residency status of anyone in police custody who they suspect is an illegal
immigrant. See Nick Miroff, Pr. William Passes Resolution Targeting Illegal Immigration,
Washington
Post,
Jul.
11
2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/07/10/AR2007071002093.html. See also supra note 135.
151See,

for example, the 287(g) implementation in Maricopa County, Arizona, where officers are
authorized to check the residency status of anyone pulled over for any traffic violation. Randal C.
Archibold, Arizona County Uses New Law to Look for Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. Times, May 10,
2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/10/us/10smuggle.html?fta=y.
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requires local officers to understand and apply an immigration code that is
notoriously complex, the risk of error arises.
The Justice Department often attempts to reduce the risk of error through
relatively direct supervision: the federal government attempts to draft agreements
that specify more precisely what is expected of local agents, the agents are required
to complete training before engaging in immigration enforcement, and the Justice
Department tries to monitor the agents to identify bad behavior.152 SCOMM,
however, reflects a very different model: the delegation to local agents is more
constrained, because their role in the screening process is only to pass identification
information about arrestees along to the federal government. This eliminates the
need for local officials to have any knowledge about immigration law. And one
would expect that screening through the federal database, backed by individual
judgment of federal immigration officers who must decide whether to issue a
detainer when the database returns a hit, would almost certainly produce fewer errors
than screening by local officials with little training and many duties unrelated to
immigration enforcement.
SCOMM also does a better job of preventing local officials from biasing the
federal government’s enforcement priorities, particularly among local governments
who are inclined to shirk or who consider themselves “sanctuary cities.”153 SCOMM
is different from 287(g) in a way that is central to agency discretion: SCOMM
participation is basically mandatory, while 287(g) required individual jurisdictions to
opt into detailed agreements with DHS in order to participate.154 To be clear, there
is an ongoing dispute about whether SCOMM is formally mandatory. For instance,
Illinois recently announced that it was withdrawing from SCOMM, but it is unclear
whether this declaration has any legal effect.155 Even if the program is not formally
mandatory, however, ICE has shifted the default for participation with tremendous
effect. It has proven quite difficult to opt out of participation, and ICE is rapidly
rolling out program around the country. Technological hurdles prevented DHS
from activating every jurisdiction in the country simultaneously, but in just over two
years DHS has already activated nearly 1,000 jurisdictions, and the agency predicts

152See, for example, the 287(g) Memorandum of Agreement signed by Maricopa County, available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/memorandumsofAgreementUnderstanding/r_287gmaricopacountyso102609.pdf; see
also Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Settles Lawsuit with Maricopa
County Sheriff’s Office, June 2, 2011 (discussing the Justice Department’s settlement with the
Maricopa County sheriff’s department withdrawing some of their authority in light of alleged abuses).
153 See Lisa M. Seghetti, et al., Enforcing Immigration Law: The Role of State and Local Law
Enforcement, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 26 (2006), retrieved from
http://www.ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/2006,0912-crs.pdf, for a discussion of sanctuary cities.
154

INA § 287(g)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2009).

See Julia Preston, States Resisting Program Central to Obama’s Immigration Strategy, N.Y. Times,
May 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/us/06immigration.html; see also supra note 142 (DHS
fact sheet stating that participation by local jurisdictions is not discretionary).
155
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that it will have near nationwide coverage by the end of 2012.156 After fifteen years
of existence, the 287(g) program still has fewer than 100 participating jurisdictions.157
Thus, reluctant enforcement agents cannot easily avoid assisting the federal
government with enforcement the way they could under 287(g).
Even if we focus only on those jurisdictions that do participate, SCOMM
constrains local discretion more than 287(g). Because 287(g) agreements sometimes
give local officials freestanding authority to enforce immigration law, it confers
considerable discretion on these officials to decide when and where to target
enforcement resources. SCOMM, on the other hand, piggy-backs on local arrests
that, in theory, are already taking place for other reasons. Thus, it provides fewer
opportunities for local officials with different preferences to bias enforcement
priorities.
Fewer opportunities does not mean, of course, no opportunities. While the
federal government would ideally prefer state policing behavior be inelastic to the
decision to layer immigration enforcement on top of criminal enforcement, it cannot
ensure that this is true. Local officials still control whether a person is screened by
SCOMM, because screening requires arrest and local officials decide whom to arrest.
A central question, therefore, is whether state or local officials will change their local
policing behavior in response to the implementation of SCOMM in their
jurisdictions.
Control over arrest authority appears to provide greater opportunities for local
agents who would prefer more immigration enforcement than for those who would
prefer less. It is hard to imagine that the Chicago police would forego arrests in
order to prevent persons from being screened through SCOMM. Yet it is not
terribly difficult for a local government to arrest persons precisely so that they will be
screened. As criminal justice scholars frequently note, local officials have
tremendous arrest discretion.158 And the arrest need not lead to a conviction, or
even to formal charges, for the arrestee to be flagged and placed in removal
proceedings. Thus, SCOMM’s reliance on arrests as the screening trigger afford
local officials more discretion than they would have if the trigger was located later
point in the criminal process, such as following a conviction.
While this discussion suggests that SCOMM may more effectively discipline
sanctuary-city agents than immigration-restrictionist agents, an asymmetry in the
federal government’s ability to monitor local agents cuts in the opposite direction.
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See Secure Communities: The Basics, at http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/

See http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf, (for current SCOMM participation);
cf. http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm (for the up-to-date list of participating entities that
have mutually signed 287(g) agreements with ICE).
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Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the
Administration of Justice, 69 Yale L.J. 4 (discussing the discretion of local officers/authorities in making
arrest decisions).
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When the federal government delegates to local agents it often has somewhat
asymmetrical review authority because of the nature of immigration decisions. In the
early days of immigration enforcement, decisions by local officials to deny admission
were subject to federal court review, because an alien “in custody” by virtue of his
denial of admission could seek habeas review.159 But grants of admission were not
subject to judicial review and as a practical matter were likely subject to essentially no
oversight.
Today the situation is reversed. The federal government can decline to initiate
proceedings against someone flagged through SCOMM.160 But decisions by a local
cop not to arrest a person pursuant to his 287(g) authority, or not to arrest a person
whom she suspects will be flagged by SCOMM’s database after booking, or a
decision by a local prosecutor to reduce or drop charges that she knows will make a
defendant deportable, are largely unreviewable by federal authorities. Moreover,
even outside the context of SCOMM and § 287(g), immigration law’s reliance on
outcomes from the state criminal justice system delegates power in a second way as
well. As we noted above, convictions for certain crimes render noncitizens
deportable.161 But because the fact of conviction and the statute under which a
noncitizen is convicted often determine whether immigration consequences attach to
criminal conduct, inadmissibility and deportability frequently turn on a state’s
arresting, charging, and plea practices. For example, county prosecutors often have
the option of charging a defendant with at least two offenses, one that will render the
defendant deportable and one that will not. And even if the prosecutor charges the
deportable offense, defense lawyers negotiating plea agreements can bargain for a
conviction that saves the defendant from deportation. Thus, even though federal
immigration law’s reliance on state criminal law formally imposes an equality
constraint on the delegation of power to states—where changes to a state’s criminal
code affects citizens and noncitizens equally—in practice local officials have
considerable latitude to help a noncitizen avoid deportation through charge- and
sentence-bargaining. Thus, some “shirking” by local agents intended to reduce the
level of immigration enforcement is more difficult than overzealous enforcement
behavior for the federal government to monitor.162
C. Tailoring Immigration Policy to Local Conditions
In the above discussion the federal government wanted to rely on states to
help it identify immigration violators, but wants immigration policy to be uniform
159 See Lucy E. Salyer, Law Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the Shaping of Modern
Immigration Law, 247-248 (1995) (discussing habeas review with respect to the Chinese Exclusion
Act).
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See Secure Communities: The Secure Communities Process, at http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/.
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For discussion of this general problem in enforcement regimes, see Richard McAdams et al,
Punitive Police? Agency Costs, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure (working paper 2011)
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around the country. We might also imagine, however, that the federal government
would like immigration policy to vary based on local conditions.
There is a longstanding debate among immigration scholars about the role that
local conditions should play in shaping immigration policy. Peter Schuck,163 Cristina
Rodriguez,164 Peter Spiro,165 and others have suggested that state and local
governments should have authority over immigration policy because migration
affects local communities in different ways. While this scholarship is concerned
almost exclusively with the question whether immigration law should be responsive to
local conditions, we are interested instead in the question how a nation might design
immigration law to be responsive to these conditions.
1. Local Conditions and Information Advantages
There are several sorts of local conditions that might be relevant to
immigration policy. Local labor market conditions may influence demand for
migration to a particular place. For example, purported shortages of sugar cane
cutters in central Florida were part of what motivated the creation of the H-2A guest
worker program in 1990.166 The effect of migration on the provision of public goods
may also have significant effects on the demand for migrants. Border states like
Arizona and Texas frequently complain that current levels of migration strain their
public schools, hospitals, and so forth.
It is important to recognize that federal immigration law already makes some
local conditions formally relevant. Consider three prominent examples:


Federal immigration law explicitly makes variation in local labor market
conditions a valid reason to accept or reject a particular migrant applying
for a labor visa. To qualify for a visa, an applicant’s sponsoring employer
must show that it has performed a search and is unable to locate another
worker to fill the position. The search is often local, rather than national,
in scope. As we explained in Part II,167 the assumption is that immigrant
workers can be absorbed without cost to areas that face labor shortages,
but will drive down the wages of existing workers if they immigrate to
areas without any shortage.
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See Peter Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHICAGO LAW FORUM 57.
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See Cristina Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008).

See Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1635–36
(1997).
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Criminal deportation rules rely extensively on the structure of state
criminal law. Consequently, a noncitizen’s deportability will often depend
on the state in which noncitizen was convicted of committing a crime.



Family admission rules sometimes turn on the content of state law.
Differences among state marriage requirements can determine whether a
noncitizen is eligible for admission as the spouse of a U.S. citizen or lawful
permanent resident.

These examples suggest that the incorporation of local conditions may be
somewhat haphazard. In the first example, the federal government is concerned
about local labor market conditions. As we explained above, however, this idea
often underestimates the extent to which the labor market in the United States is
national rather than local. Reliance on local conditions in the labor market may
therefore be largely illusory. At the same time, potentially more significant local
costs are often treated as formally irrelevant by federal immigration law. Many social
services, such as education, are financed predominantly at the state and local level.
In theory, therefore, it might make more sense to take these local costs into account
than anticipated labor market effects. Yet admission and deportation decisions are
not formally responsive to the cost of providing local public goods to immigrants.
Moreover, the examples suggest several different possible types of “local
conditions” of interest. In the first example, the federal government is interested in
some measure of the local labor market benefits of migration. The second and third
examples are quite different: the “local condition” on which admissions and
deportation decisions turn is the content of state law. It is possible that some of the
reliance on state law reflects the desire to ease the administration of federal
immigration law. Relying on state family law, for example, saves the federal
government from creating a duplicate federal family law for immigration purposes.
Nonetheless, the incorporation of state law may reflect a desire to incorporate local
norms embodied in those laws.
Which local conditions are relevant to federal immigration policy will affect
the desirability of delegating to states. This is because states may be more likely to
have better information than the federal government about some local conditions
but not others. For example, states and local governments may be more likely to
have superior information about the costs of local public goods, but less likely to
have superior information about “local” labor market conditions. (In fact,
immigration law does not delegate to states questions about local labor markets,
leaving to individual employers the task of supplying this information.)
2. Interstate mobility and local variation
Even if states and local governments have superior information about local
conditions, a central question is whether immigration policy can really vary around
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the country on the basis of those conditions. This sort of variation presupposes that
the federal government can, say, reduce the number of migrants going to Arizona
while increasing the number of migrants going to New York. But immigration law is
not thought to work this way. A visa entitles a noncitizen to enter the United
States—not some particular state. Moreover, after a noncitizen is admitted,
American constitutional law may prohibit the government from imposing formal
restrictions on the ability of migrants to travel between states.168 For these reasons,
perhaps the idea of local immigration policy is logically impossible under American
law.
How can this critique be squared with the fact that federal immigration law
already does rely formally on some local conditions? For some of those local
conditions—like local labor market conditions—the critique may provide a further
reason to doubt the sensibility of the existing immigration rules. For the criminal
deportation rules, however, existing immigration law suggests that the freedom of
movement does not necessarily undermine the idea of local variation in immigration
policy. There are two reasons for this. First, there are powerful reasons why
migrants will not always pick states of residence based on the content of some state
rule that might affect their deportability in the future. Migrants generally do not
have the sort of flexibility about where to live that modern corporations have about
where to incorporate. Family and social networks, financial constraints, job
opportunities, and so forth are all far more powerful than the content of state
criminal law.
Moreover, sometimes immigration law even effectively restricts mobility after
entry. Consider the various temporary farm worker programs that the United States
has employed during the twentieth century. In many of these programs, including
the infamous Bracero program and the modern H-2A program, the immigrant’s visa
is tied to a single employer who is bringing the worker to work in a particular
place.169 The immigrant’s admission is temporary, often lasting only a few months,
and there is no visa portability. While workers are not prohibited from crossing state
lines, as a practical matter their temporary admission, fixed place of employment, and
lack of visa portability combine with their working conditions and economic status
basically limit their stay to one state. Thus, de facto restrictions on mobility have
been a common feature of American immigration law.
Thus, even if the federal government does not delegate to each state by
authorizing the state to issue admissions visas valid only for that particular state, local
variation in immigration policy is both possible and even relatively common in
American immigration law.
Some states, such as China, do limit internal migration, but no modern democracies formally limit
internal mobility. See Delia Davin, Internal Migration in Contemporary China, 39-48 (1998)
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169 See MAE NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA
(2004) (discussing Bracero program’s rules); INA § 218, 8 U.S.C. § 1188 (2009).
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3. Externalities and local politics
Delegating immigration screening authority to states in areas where they have
superior information about local conditions raises two important costs. First, states
might use their authority to impose externalities on other states. Here the agent’s
advantage—it has better information about immigration’s local effects and greater
incentives to pay attention to those effects—becomes a disadvantage.
Second, states might use their authority to skew the federal government’s
enforcement priorities because of local preferences regarding migration policy. In
other words, the local agents may have better information, but they may also be
biased. Arizona’s concern about current immigration levels might reflect the fact the
state is bearing disproportionate costs from migration. This was Texas’s claim back
in the days of Plyler v. Doe,170 when it claimed that it needed to exclude some
immigrants (those who lacked status) from the school system because of the costs
they imposed on the system. But Arizona’s resistance might also be the product of
the state citizens’ preferences regarding migration: they might simply favor much
lower levels of immigration than other voters around the country.
One way the federal government might try to ameliorate this problem is to
limit the states to supplying the federal government with information regarding local
conditions. As with the identification of immigrant violators, this preserves the
federal government’s ability to monitor the states. But if the states have superior
information, it is far from clear how effective this monitoring can be. In this respect
information about local conditions is different than information about violators:
much of the value of that information lay in the identification of individuals in
contexts where the federal government could itself determine deportability.
Monitoring in that context may be relatively easier for the federal government.
A second strategy is to rely on behavior by states that provides information
about local conditions but is inelastic to the states preferences about immigration
law. Relying on such behavior makes it much more difficult for the state agents to
misrepresent local conditions in order to bias immigration policy toward the state’s
preferences. For example, if the federal government wants criminal deportation to
turn on conduct that is considered sufficiently serious within a local community,
then relying on state criminal law to determine deportability may be a good way of
getting information about local norms about criminal misconduct without the risk of
the state rigging that information because it was especially pro- or anti-immigrant. It
is unlikely that a state will rewrite its general criminal laws regarding assault or drug
use just to increase or decrease deportations.171
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457 U.S. 202 (1982).

As we explained earlier, however, the inelasticity of state criminal codes is undermined at least
somewhat by the existing of prosecutorial discretion—something more likely an issue for minor
171
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CONCLUSION
Canadian-style centralized systems of migrant screening are popular outside
the United States, and to many people they seem more rational than the American
system, which relies heavily on delegated authority to various agents. However, the
American system can be explained as a decentralized system that harnesses the
private information of various stakeholders by delegating authority to them to select
migrants subject to various constraints.
Whether the American system is in fact superior to a more centralized
immigration system is an empirical question, which we have not tried to answer as it
would take us far afield. But it is worth observing that the United States has enjoyed
extraordinary success in replenishing its population with waves of migrants, who
have voluntarily assimilated. This experience can be compared favorably to that of
Europe, where countries have found themselves with hostile groups of unassimilated
migrants and their children, whose failure to assimilate has become an explosive
political issue. We cannot prove that these difference outcomes show that the U.S.
system is superior, but they are highly suggestive.
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offenses than for serious criminal offenses such as murder and rape. See supra text accompanying
notes 157-162.
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